Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency memorandum of 18 December 1961, sent to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, encloses a verbatim translation of a Soviet article from the top secret 1960 first issue of the special collection of Military Thought. In the article, Colonel-General A. Gastilovich argues that nuclear missiles call for revising Soviet military doctrine. He favors short blitz operations, smaller ground forces and new rescue troops. It mentions "flying saucers" only as ground effect machines for army aviation.
“The Advance”5 pages
1.3(a (4) actions, but is yielding to meeting engagements and envelopment. The taking of radioactively contaminated zones created by the enemy acquires great importance. It must be carried out by large units, depending upon the tasks they are fulfilling, the meteorological situation, and the degree of permissible dosage of radiation received during the period of action. Depending upon these conditions, the contaminated zones are taken either by a rapid forward push or by bypassing, or in the final analysis, the troops continue to carry out their mission in the contaminated zone without regard to possible ' losses. All discussions regarding the creation of passages into contaminated zones, the surmounting of them in helicopters andothers are utopian at the present time. In planning contemporary offensive operations on the scale of . a front and armies, it is impossible to proceed from an single "D" - (day). In terms of time, operations will flow in different directions, at different tempos and it is more advisable to plan them by calendar days (except, of coursej the initial retaliatory missile strike). Moreover, 'concrete army and large unit tasks can be established for only 1-2 days and for a longer period it is sufficient to indicate the general direction, the nature of the activities and final goal of the operation. More detailed planning is highly problematical, since sharp changes in the situation are unavoidable as a result of enemy nuclear strikes. The tempos of contemporary operations may be planned, as already mentioned, up to 80 to 100 and more kilometers during a 24-hr. period. but it must be kept in mind that, as a result of enemy nuclear - strikes on our deep rear, the front will not be.able to rely on systematic delivery from the rear of the .country. Everything which is essential must already be stored in the theaters in peacetime and such supplies as POL must, to a significant degree, be sought out from var trophies in the course of the advance. * It is also essential to take into account the cumulative physical tension on tank and truck di'ivers (it will be necessary to have two reliefs for interchange of crew members) and the large number of vehicles which will go out of commission. Vigorous maneuver and nuclear strikes must become"the basis of contemporary defense. He who sits in place, even in prepared positiais, will be knocked out by nuclear weapons or bypassed. Only a relatively small part of the forces can hold separate areas or positions with the aim of slowing the tempo of the enemy advance along axes which ~ 1,3(a)( - - -13 -- 1
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 23 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.