III-018 “The Theory of Military Art Needs Review,” by Col. Gen. A.I. Gastilovich and Lt. Gen. I.A. Tolkonyuk, special collection of Military Thought, top secret issue No. 1, 1960, CIA/DP Clandestine Report Special Collection, 18 December 1961,

hostilities and designated as reinforcement for the first echelon
during an offensive, but on the defensive - for counterattacks and
countoratrikes. To overcoma enemy opposition during an offensive,
there should not be concentration of troops by bringing in the
. second echelon, but concentration of nuclear veapons and their means
of dolivery (nositel). On~y when there is en insufficient quantity
of these means can a strike be undertaken by several divisions, and
then not with a comtpact striking group, but rather from several
directions.
The possibility of enemy use of high-yield nuclear warheads in
the field of hostilities obliges even those small groupings, of
division size as we mentioned, to operate at a distance of 20 to O
or more kilometers from eachr other or, as we frequently point out,
to operate in separate-directions.
Ztoreover, the inclination of each advancing large unit to lend
assistance to its noighbor, to wheel rapidly if necessary in a new
direction for a strike against the enemy rear i "binding princiepl
of coordinated action. -
Therefore, the conduct of offensive operations now requires a -
significantly lesser operational density but a larger number 'of tank
- divisions in the first echelon. Divisions located in the zone of
interior and moving up -- are not the second echelon but rather,
reserves designated as replacements for decimated divisions of the .
first echelon and for the circumvention of all types of obstacles.
It is necessary to reject decisively the inclination developed .
in previous wars toward encirclement of separate groupings and the
forietion of rings around them. This tendency is very viable and
has rcined with us- as an inheritance from the period when there
wore no other methods for annihilation of the enemy Left in the rear
of advancing troops. Nowadays, the enemy left in the rear must be
destroyed either in meeting engagements by reserve large units and
units or if stationary, they must be annihilated with nuclear strikes.
! The latter, of course, is preferable.
In the training of troops, -it is necessary also to reject decisive-
ly "the cultivatibri of the principle of break through the enemy's
prepared defenses. It is possible, of course, in individual
instances when the enemy defense cannot be bypassed or annihilated
. by nuclear strike. In the main, however, under conditions not in-
volving solid fronts or heated battles, the breakthrough of an enemy
prepared defense has ceased to be the primary form of offensive
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