III-018 “The Theory of Military Art Needs Review,” by Col. Gen. A.I. Gastilovich and Lt. Gen. I.A. Tolkonyuk, special collection of Military Thought, top secret issue No. 1, 1960, CIA/DP Clandestine Report Special Collection, 18 December 1961,

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instances when the latter, for one reason or another, found them-
aelvcs without sufficient nuclear/msile weapons. Strikes in the
interests of separate fronts could be carried out either on command
of the Stavka (or the co:nd of theater forces) or upon requests
of the fronts within the range of prescribed limitations. -
At the same time, this VGK issile formation can carry out
separaie tasks assigned by the Stavka which are not directly connected
with the activities of the fronts.
In all instances the VGKC operational missile formation must have
at its disposal 'its own long-range means of reconnaissance. (aviation, -
radiotechnical, and others), in order to be able to respond rapidly
to a change in the situation and to avoid multi-channel coordinations
of reconnaissance tasks.
It appears expedient to us to plan the YK missile operations
as special operations for the destruction of onemy nuclear weapons, -
for undcrnining his economic potential, for co:bat against supply,
etc. All this gust be a contitucnt part of two types of missile
operations: those operations carried out by the YVI missile troop
forations with the aim of corplote annihilation of an eney country
and knocking it out of the war, or operations in support of ground
troops. 2issile operations of the first type usually must precede
operations of the second type and, subseguontly, are also carried
out simitaneously. It is obvious that the nature of the targets
under attack will be different in each type of operation.
It is absolutely unnecessary to deploy YGK missile formations,
in coordinated action with ground troops, directly in the theater of
military activities or close to it. On the contrary, their placement
in the zone of interior; is even preferable, since this sakes the
work. of ency intelligence more difficult and negates the need to -
form a separate antiaircraft defense of these forationa; their F7
can be combined with the antiaircraft defense of certain areas of
the country.
The execution of VGK missile operations, the possibility of
similar strikes by the ene:y, the repletion of ground troops with
their own organic nuclear/missile means, and the possibility of using
high-yield nuclear warheads, not only in the zone of interior, but
in engagements and even on the field of battle, demnnds thorough
review of certain postulates of our military doctrine in connection
with the operations of ground troops.
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