Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency memorandum of 18 December 1961, sent to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, encloses a verbatim translation of a Soviet article from the top secret 1960 first issue of the special collection of Military Thought. In the article, Colonel-General A. Gastilovich argues that nuclear missiles call for revising Soviet military doctrine. He favors short blitz operations, smaller ground forces and new rescue troops. It mentions "flying saucers" only as ground effect machines for army aviation.
operational, or even strategic, reserves can hardly be expected. It is more likely that it will be necessary to overcome the resistance of enemy troops retreating from the border zone. To exploit the first powerful missile strike it will be completely unnecessary to deploy a large number of divisions, as was done in past war . Taking over the border zone and the zones of total destruction and radiation will n cesitate special organization and preparation of troops, but will ot at all, necessitate multi-million-man armies. The execution of thi type of mission in the European theater of military operations a front of 600-700 km, for example, is - possible with 20-25 visions,.priarily tank, rushing ahead along - separate axes and in separate heated battles, pounding the large - units and units of t e enery which offer resistance in the above- ! mentioned zones. Of course, a significant portion of these troops ' will suffer from en nuclear strikes; relatively frequent re- placement of entire rge units which have sustained heavy losses ' - will be necesoary. F this reason there should be 10-15 more reserve divisions be nd them; in all 30-40 divisions, vell equipped with tactical nuclear weapons, and which will make up the first operational echelon, . be required. Organizationally, the strike of the first operational echelon in a zone of 600-700 km may be represented by two fronts of 15-20 divisions each, plus a certain number of divisions of 'airborne forces, (2 or 3 for a front). A front may consist of 2 or 3 armies of 4 or 5 divisions, each acting in a zone of 100 to 200 km, plus a certain number of divisions of the front reserve. Forces, mobilized in the interior of the country, can arrive gradually in the theater of military operations, probably after the completion of the first operations at the front, and their principal - role will consist of occupation of captured territory. If, after taking over the territory of a country subjected to the first massive nuclear attack, the enemy does not capitulate a similar all-shattering strike may be repeated on the next country. From the aforementioned, it does not follow of course, that those divisions which will be in action in the firot operatioral echelon of ground troops ill be sufficient for the war na a whole. It is apparent that in accordance with the forward movc:nt a signifi- cant number of troops which have bedn designated for carrying cut " ~-8-. t ~()4
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 23 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.