Documents / FOIA release

Contribution to NIE 11-14-64 Capabilities of Soviet General-Purpose Forces 1964-70, CIA/DI/ORR, 6 October 1964

Central Intelligence Agency · 53 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA Office of Research and Reports contribution to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-64, dated 6 October 1964, on the capabilities of Soviet general-purpose forces from 1964 to 1970. It updates evidence on Soviet doctrine for theater warfare, the effect of low wartime birth rates on military conscription and the labor supply, tactical missile systems, the Soviet and Satellite tactical air forces, and Soviet naval submarine, surface and air forces. The report does not mention unidentified flying objects.

  • p. 38 …Soviet Naval General-Purpose Forces Traditional missions such as interdicting Western sea lines of com- munication…
  • p. 39 Soviet Navy to protect the sea lines of communication so vital to amphibious operations is severely…
  • p. 40 …Including tso vrdlov class in the Black Sea fitted for ji ssile :, D. -34-
  • p. 41 …probable J-class units in the Black Sea in late.1963. There also is tenuous evidence…
  • p. 47 …in the Baltic and Black Sea areas and the Sea of Japan. their use is primarily…
  • p. 49 …had great difficulty in locating them at sea. (TSD) The limited range of naval aircraft restricts…
  • p. 50 …It appears to be effective in local sea theaters off Soviet-controlled coastlines where surface and…
  • p. 52 …placed in service, probably in the Black Sea area where the operating environment might be compatible…
time of a new discussion of military doctrine -- recalling the discus-
sion initiated by Khrushchev in connection with his earlier reform
program in 1960 -- suggested that a new effort was getting underway to
bring Soviet military policy into line with Khrushchev's strategic con-
cepts.
The initial course of discussion in the military press during the
early months of this year, however, indicated little progress for re-
form. Although most of the articles in the new doctrinal series ex-
hibited a veneer of modernist verbiage, many of them reiterated tra-
ditionalist arguments tending to support the need for maintaining theater
warfare capabilities in contemporary conditions. A virtual resurgence
of traditionalist agitation occurred at one stage in the discussion
when a cluster of articles appeared openly extolling the "older" arms
and even questioning the validity of newer "official" concepts. On
the practical level, also, reform appeared to be faring poorly. Khru-
shchev's proposal for the reduction of manpower remained officially in
force, but there was very little evidence that any substantial force
reductions were actually taking place. In the meantime, the military
leadership maintained a conspicuous silence on the measure. HR70-14
In spite of these unfavorable auspices, however, the discussion
took a turn in Khrushchev's favor and has now resulted in a major new
doctrinal formulation that strongly reinforces his campaign for reform.
The principal contribution of the new formulation is to remove the
ambiguity that heretofore surrounded the Soviet concept of the
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 53 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.