Documents / FOIA release

Contribution to NIE 11-14-64 Capabilities of Soviet General-Purpose Forces 1964-70, CIA/DI/ORR, 6 October 1964

Central Intelligence Agency · 53 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA Office of Research and Reports contribution to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-64, dated 6 October 1964, on the capabilities of Soviet general-purpose forces from 1964 to 1970. It updates evidence on Soviet doctrine for theater warfare, the effect of low wartime birth rates on military conscription and the labor supply, tactical missile systems, the Soviet and Satellite tactical air forces, and Soviet naval submarine, surface and air forces. The report does not mention unidentified flying objects.

  • p. 38 …Soviet Naval General-Purpose Forces Traditional missions such as interdicting Western sea lines of com- munication…
  • p. 39 Soviet Navy to protect the sea lines of communication so vital to amphibious operations is severely…
  • p. 40 …Including tso vrdlov class in the Black Sea fitted for ji ssile :, D. -34-
  • p. 41 …probable J-class units in the Black Sea in late.1963. There also is tenuous evidence…
  • p. 47 …in the Baltic and Black Sea areas and the Sea of Japan. their use is primarily…
  • p. 49 …had great difficulty in locating them at sea. (TSD) The limited range of naval aircraft restricts…
  • p. 50 …It appears to be effective in local sea theaters off Soviet-controlled coastlines where surface and…
  • p. 52 …placed in service, probably in the Black Sea area where the operating environment might be compatible…
TQOsSECRET
the strategic forces at the expense of the traditional arms -- have
encountered persistent opposition from the military leadership. Public
contention has arisen over questions of the allocation of resources,
the structure of the armed forces, and the kind of war for which the
Soviet armed forces should be equipped and trained to fight. The
result has been something of an impasse in defense policy: Khrushchev's
efforts at reform have been deflected, modified, and even blocked. A
military establishment adapted to the requirements for large-scale
theater warfare on the European continent has continued to coexist
with a military doctrine increasingly oriented toward the threat of
nuclear warfare with a transoceanic enemy.
In recent months, signs have accumulated that this impasse may be
breaking. A new phase of controversy has been underway that appears to
reflect pressures for change at the policy level. The character of
the controversy, the circumstances in which it has developed, and the
trends that it has exhibited suggest that a new step is being taken
to resolve the inconsistencies in the existing doctrines concerning
strategic and theater warfare.
Tfhe latest phase in the controversy opened at the end of 1963,
when an announcement by Khrushchev that a military manpower cut was
being contemplated evoked a visible negative reaction from military
leaders. It is now known that this announcement came at a time when
a new program of strategic missile deployment was just getting underway.
This coincidence, plus the initiation in the military press at the same
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 53 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.