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Contribution to NIE 11-14-64 Capabilities of Soviet General-Purpose Forces 1964-70, CIA/DI/ORR, 6 October 1964

Central Intelligence Agency · 53 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA Office of Research and Reports contribution to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-64, dated 6 October 1964, on the capabilities of Soviet general-purpose forces from 1964 to 1970. It updates evidence on Soviet doctrine for theater warfare, the effect of low wartime birth rates on military conscription and the labor supply, tactical missile systems, the Soviet and Satellite tactical air forces, and Soviet naval submarine, surface and air forces. The report does not mention unidentified flying objects.

  • p. 37 …Satellite Air Forces The primary mission of the Satellite air forces is air defense, but because…
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The capabilities of the Submarine Force are augmented by
the Soviet Naval Air Forces (SNAF). Currently available for operations
against surface forces are approximately 110 Badger A reconnaissance/
tanker aircraft, 65 Badger B ASM-carriers, 210 Badger C ASM-carriers,
and 40 to 50 Blinder aircraft. Judging from the exercises they have
conducted, these forces generally are well trained and well equipped,
although their effectiveness is limited by problems of target acquisi-
tion and aircraft range.
Target acquisition for SNAF aircraft usually is achieved
through radio direction finding supplemented by occasional reports
from such sources as merchant or fishing vessels. When US surface units
have moved under conditions of maximum' communications security, the
Soviet defenses have had great difficulty in locating them at sea. (TSD)
The limited range of naval aircraft restricts their recon-
naissance and strike capability. To overcome this handicap, Long Range
Aviation (LRA) bomber units have been assigned a secondary mission of
assisting the SNAF in carrying out strikes against surface units at
considerable distances from the USSR.
2. Against Submarines
Soviet naval authorities have demonstrated a marked aware-
ness in their writings and statements of the threat arising from US
Polaris-missile submarines, and the evolving force structure has been
heavily oriented toward ASW operations. Two major problems lie at the
root of effective Soviet ASW operations -- the detection of attacking
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 53 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.