Documents / FOIA release

Contribution to NIE 11-14-64 Capabilities of Soviet General-Purpose Forces 1964-70, CIA/DI/ORR, 6 October 1964

Central Intelligence Agency · 53 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA Office of Research and Reports contribution to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-64, dated 6 October 1964, on the capabilities of Soviet general-purpose forces from 1964 to 1970. It updates evidence on Soviet doctrine for theater warfare, the effect of low wartime birth rates on military conscription and the labor supply, tactical missile systems, the Soviet and Satellite tactical air forces, and Soviet naval submarine, surface and air forces. The report does not mention unidentified flying objects.

Open the PDF at page 43 Original source ↗

“Sea”8 pages

  • p. 38 …Soviet Naval General-Purpose Forces Traditional missions such as interdicting Western sea lines of com- munication…
  • p. 39 Soviet Navy to protect the sea lines of communication so vital to amphibious operations is severely…
  • p. 40 …Including tso vrdlov class in the Black Sea fitted for ji ssile :, D. -34-
  • p. 41 …probable J-class units in the Black Sea in late.1963. There also is tenuous evidence…
  • p. 47 …in the Baltic and Black Sea areas and the Sea of Japan. their use is primarily…
  • p. 49 …had great difficulty in locating them at sea. (TSD) The limited range of naval aircraft restricts…
  • p. 50 …It appears to be effective in local sea theaters off Soviet-controlled coastlines where surface and…
  • p. 52 …placed in service, probably in the Black Sea area where the operating environment might be compatible…
TOP SECRET
2. Surface Forces
Naval surface forces are and will remain to a large extent
heavily dependent on land-based logistic and air support during the
period of this estimate. Nonmissile equipped major surface units now
include 14 light cruisers, 83 destroyers, and 58 destroyer escorts.
The USSR now has 16 operational destroyers armed with cruise-type
surface-to-surface missiles. In addition, it is estimated that there
are five SAM destroyers and two to three SAM escorts in an operational
status. It is estimated that the numbers of these latter two classes
of ships will increase threefold during the period of this estimate.
Such a growth will contribute to an improvement in the effective range
at which Soviet naval forces can operate from their home bases.
In the surface ship construction programs, greater capa-
bilities for antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and anti-air defenses are
being emphasized. The Kynda class appears to have been replaced by the
Kashin class, with double the SAM firepower. Expanded production of
the Kashin class to an estimated rate of two to four units per year
should improve gradually the Soviet capabilities to conduct. ASW opera-
tions beyond the range of shore-based air cover. In addition to the
Kashin-class program, it is estimated that a new SAM-equipped ocean
escort is being built. The evidence concerning this latter class is
inconclusive, but it could correspond to "Project No. 35" at the Nikolayev
Shipyard 445.
- 37 -
TOP SECRET

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 53 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.