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Contribution to NIE 11-14-64 Capabilities of Soviet General-Purpose Forces 1964-70, CIA/DI/ORR, 6 October 1964

Central Intelligence Agency · 53 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA Office of Research and Reports contribution to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-64, dated 6 October 1964, on the capabilities of Soviet general-purpose forces from 1964 to 1970. It updates evidence on Soviet doctrine for theater warfare, the effect of low wartime birth rates on military conscription and the labor supply, tactical missile systems, the Soviet and Satellite tactical air forces, and Soviet naval submarine, surface and air forces. The report does not mention unidentified flying objects.

  • p. 38 …Soviet Naval General-Purpose Forces Traditional missions such as interdicting Western sea lines of com- munication…
  • p. 39 Soviet Navy to protect the sea lines of communication so vital to amphibious operations is severely…
  • p. 40 …Including tso vrdlov class in the Black Sea fitted for ji ssile :, D. -34-
  • p. 41 …probable J-class units in the Black Sea in late.1963. There also is tenuous evidence…
  • p. 47 …in the Baltic and Black Sea areas and the Sea of Japan. their use is primarily…
  • p. 49 …had great difficulty in locating them at sea. (TSD) The limited range of naval aircraft restricts…
  • p. 50 …It appears to be effective in local sea theaters off Soviet-controlled coastlines where surface and…
  • p. 52 …placed in service, probably in the Black Sea area where the operating environment might be compatible…
Soviet Navy to protect the sea lines of communication so vital to
amphibious operations is severely limited and extends for only short
distances. Rear Admiral Bogolepov, writing in December 1961, in a
classified Soviet journal, comments on amphibious operations as follows:
Surface transport is entirely feasible but re-
quires the support of forces that are superior to
those of the enemy. What kind of forces? At
present, with the inadequate range of aircraft --
mainly surface means. Calculations show that if
we wanted to we could create such forces no earlier
than 15 to 20 years from now, and this is clearly
useless.
The creation of a small "marine corps'" seems to indicate a Soviet
requirement for forces specially trained for limited beach assault or
sabotage activities rather than an intention to expand sealift and
amphibious operations to a significant degree.
Current naval programs reflect the continuing emphasis on the pri-
mary mission of defense against carrier task forces and missile sub-
marines. These programs portray the effort to extend and improve
operational capabilities in areas beyond Soviet coastal waters.
A. Current Size and Production
1. Submarine Force
The Soviet submarine force is currently estimated at about
370 ships (see Table 7*). It consists of 22 to 26 nuclear submarines,
320 first-line diesel submarines, and 22 second-line diesel submarines.
* P. 34, below.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 53 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.