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Contribution to NIE 11-14-64 Capabilities of Soviet General-Purpose Forces 1964-70, CIA/DI/ORR, 6 October 1964

Central Intelligence Agency · 53 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA Office of Research and Reports contribution to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-64, dated 6 October 1964, on the capabilities of Soviet general-purpose forces from 1964 to 1970. It updates evidence on Soviet doctrine for theater warfare, the effect of low wartime birth rates on military conscription and the labor supply, tactical missile systems, the Soviet and Satellite tactical air forces, and Soviet naval submarine, surface and air forces. The report does not mention unidentified flying objects.

  • p. 7 …advanced weapons systems. Thus far this process has affected mainly the tech- nical aspects of the…
  • p. 35 …With respect to the composition of the force, it is antici- pated that the replacement of…
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40 to 50 percent of the total number of aircraft in the Satellite air
forces will still consist of older generation models and that only from
one-third to one-half of the total will consist of all-weather aircraft.
Nevertheless, this total will significantly enhance the all-weather air
defense capabilities of these forces. Moreover, this increment of new
models through mid-1970, which it is estimated, will total some 600 to
800 aircraft, will add substantially to over-all Soviet capabilities
for theater warfare.
V. Soviet Naval General-Purpose Forces
Traditional missions such as interdicting Western sea lines of com-
munication, defending the littoral of the Soviet Bloc, and providing
support for the seaward flanks of ground forces have been retained by
the Soviet Navy, as its missions have been expanded during recent years
to include operations against Western carrier and Polaris forces. Tn-
creasing the range and the effectiveness with which the Soviet naval
forces could counter this Western threat has resulted in a diversifica-
tion of naval forces.
In spite of the recent, establishment in the Baltic of a brigade-
size Soviet "marine corps," there is little evidence of the develop-
ment of a significant amphibious capability. Few specially designed
amphibious assault ships are available, and there is no, known construc-
tion program for them. Although the USSR has a large, modern, and
rapidly growing merchant fleet, the use of nerchant ships for support
operaticns would require good harbor facilities. The ability of the
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 53 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.