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Contribution to NIE 11-14-64 Capabilities of Soviet General-Purpose Forces 1964-70, CIA/DI/ORR, 6 October 1964

Central Intelligence Agency · 53 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA Office of Research and Reports contribution to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-64, dated 6 October 1964, on the capabilities of Soviet general-purpose forces from 1964 to 1970. It updates evidence on Soviet doctrine for theater warfare, the effect of low wartime birth rates on military conscription and the labor supply, tactical missile systems, the Soviet and Satellite tactical air forces, and Soviet naval submarine, surface and air forces. The report does not mention unidentified flying objects.

  • p. 38 …Soviet Naval General-Purpose Forces Traditional missions such as interdicting Western sea lines of com- munication…
  • p. 39 Soviet Navy to protect the sea lines of communication so vital to amphibious operations is severely…
  • p. 40 …Including tso vrdlov class in the Black Sea fitted for ji ssile :, D. -34-
  • p. 41 …probable J-class units in the Black Sea in late.1963. There also is tenuous evidence…
  • p. 47 …in the Baltic and Black Sea areas and the Sea of Japan. their use is primarily…
  • p. 49 …had great difficulty in locating them at sea. (TSD) The limited range of naval aircraft restricts…
  • p. 50 …It appears to be effective in local sea theaters off Soviet-controlled coastlines where surface and…
  • p. 52 …placed in service, probably in the Black Sea area where the operating environment might be compatible…
TOPECRET -
the first replacement of the Scud 1-b and 1-c systems occurring late in
the same year.
3. Levels of Deployment Through 1970
The programs assumed for tactical missiles and FROG's for
the years 1964-70 in the Intelligence Assumptions for Planning (IAP)
appear to be valid. The uncertainties as to the meaning of the chang-
ing patterns of evidence relative to the Scud-type systems would make
changes in the estimated programs premature at this time. Clarifida
tion of the status of the Scuds is not expected before the end of the
year, at the conclusion of the second regular training period for tac-
tical missile crews. As stated above, if general systems tests of a
follow-on to the Scud-type systems occur in the spring of 1964, deploy-
ment may result in 1966, a year earlier than forecast in the IAP.
The outcome of the reorganization of the FROG units in the
Soviet line divisions is similarly uncertain at this time. The .IAP
provides for an increase to tree la:anchers per division, the probable
minimum to be expected. The capabilities of the new truck-mounted
launcher seen in East Germany are not known. Information indicating
the incorporation of t1_is launcher into line divisions that also have
received additional FROG 3/4 s could indicate that the number of
launchers assigned to line divisions could be raised to six. Further
evidence must be acquired, however, before estimates of more than three
launchers per division will be warranted.
T 8 -
TOP ECRET

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 53 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.