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Central Intelligence Agency · 7 pages · text from the file's own layer

This Central Intelligence Agency historical essay, of unknown date, profiles the first three Directors of Central Intelligence: Sidney Souers, Hoyt Vandenberg and Roscoe Hillenkoetter. It describes their reluctance to serve, the setup of the Central Intelligence Group, the push for the National Security Act and the CIA Act of 1949, and criticism of Hillenkoetter's leadership. It notes that Hillenkoetter served on the board of NICAP, a civilian UFO group, from 1957 to 1962.

  • p. 2 …He soon fixed on Hoyt S. Vandenberg, a war hero and the nephew of a prominent…
  • p. 3 …For a look at Vandenberg’s air force career, see Phillip S. Meilinger, Hoyt S. Vandenberg…
Hoyt Sanford Vandenberg11
(10 June 1946–1 May 1947)
A West Point graduate and career military aviator, Lt. Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg shared little with Sidney
Souers other than a reluctance to serve as DCI. His goal was to become the first chief of an
independent US air force. Souers, however, saw him as just the man to give the CIG energy, and he
was also keenly aware that Vandenberg’s uncle, a powerful Republican senator, could help smooth the
way for legislation that would put central intelligence on a sound legal footing. Cannily, Souers asked
Vandenberg if he thought the powers that be would make him Chief of Staff of the Air Force just
because of his good looks—the “impossibly handsome” pilot had allegedly been singled out by Marilyn
Monroe as one of the three men with whom she would most like to be stranded on a desert island.
Souers pointed out to Vandenberg that a better way to position himself to become chief of the air force
would be to serve the President as DCI. Vandenberg saw the logic and agreed to take the job.
Vandenberg had learned the value of coordinated intelligence during a stint as commander of the 9th Air
Force in World War II, when his men played a key role in the Allies’ march across Europe, and he had
gained a thorough understanding of the CIG while serving on the Intelligence Advisory Board as the
Army’s Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G-2). When he took over from Souers on 10 June 1946,
he was up to speed on the progress that had been made and the work that remained to be done.
Souers had also spelled out many of the challenges ahead in a farewell progress report, dated 7 June
1946. The departing DCI recommended that Vandenberg seek greater authority and an independent
budget as soon as possible. Excerpts from “General Van’s” diary, included in this document collection,
reveal that the new DCI continued to consult with his predecessor as he continued the struggle to gain
independence and respect for the CIG.
Characterized by his biographer as a “superb blend of leader and manager,” Vandenberg pursued
Souers’s recommendations with gusto. His often tightly packed calendar reveals a man who had clout
and connections and did not hesitate to use them to reach his goals. Within his first months on the job,
he campaigned to double the CIG’s budget and to expand its staff; by September he had won the right
for the CIG to “hire and fire and spend.” This document collection also shows him dealing with the nitty-
gritty problems generated by these strategic victories. Few later DCIs would take issue with his
concerns about space, and his desire to have all CIG employees in a single building would be echoed
by his successors for decades (see Document 1946-06-07a, 20 November 1946).
Vandenberg also set out to ensure that the CIG had the right to conduct independent research and
analysis, a discussion of which had begun under Souers (see Document 1946-03-26B). It was his
contention that the DCI “should not be required to rely solely upon evaluated intelligence from the
various departments,” each of which would assess information through a parochial lens.12 Although
forced to backtrack on his demand that funding, facilities, and personnel be centralized in the CIG, he
did eventually succeed in securing a measure of independence and set up the Office of Reports and
Estimates (ORE) to undertake the new role. He also secured for ORE the responsibility for developing
a national program of scientific intelligence and the authority to coordinate all intelligence related to
foreign development of atomic energy; to support the latter, the files and personnel of the intelligence
division of the “Manhattan Engineer District”(MED), the US program to develop nuclear weapons, were
11 For more information on Hoyt Vandenberg as DCI, see Darling, op. cit., and Charles R. Christensen, “An Assessment of
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg’s Accomplishments as Director of Central Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security 11,
no. 4 (October 1996), pp. 754–64. For a look at Vandenberg’s air force career, see Phillip S. Meilinger, Hoyt S. Vandenberg:
The Life of a General (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989).
12 Darling, p. 107.

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 7 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.