Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency historical essay, of unknown date, profiles the first three Directors of Central Intelligence: Sidney Souers, Hoyt Vandenberg and Roscoe Hillenkoetter. It describes their reluctance to serve, the setup of the Central Intelligence Group, the push for the National Security Act and the CIA Act of 1949, and criticism of Hillenkoetter's leadership. It notes that Hillenkoetter served on the board of NICAP, a civilian UFO group, from 1957 to 1962.
The Reluctant Directors: Souers, Vandenberg, and Hillenkoetter Sidney William Souers (26 January 1946–10 June 1946) A successful business executive and veteran naval intelligence reservist, Rear Admiral Sidney Souers was the first Director of Central Intelligence, a post created by a presidential directive on 22 January 1946. At a brief installation ceremony in the White House, Harry Truman issued a mock proclamation dubbing him the “director of centralized snooping” and then handed Souers a black cloak and wooden dagger. Despite their mutual prominence in Missouri Democratic circles, it was apparently the first time Souers had met the President.1 Souers would spend a mere six months as DCI—a short stint that has faded into relative obscurity. Nevertheless, he was a key figure in the development of the US intelligence community in the decade following the end of World War II and would prove to be a valued national security adviser for the President. Souers was intimately familiar with the substance of the directive that established the post of DCI and was thus the logical choice for the job. A friend and protégé of Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, then Captain Souers had been named deputy chief of naval intelligence in 1944. In that capacity, he had been deeply engaged in the debate on the shape of a new national intelligence apparatus. He served as the Navy’s representative on an interdepartmental working committee, addressed the issue of military intelligence for Ferdinand Eberstadt’s study of the proposed merger of the War and Navy departments, and prepared a memo on national intelligence sent by Fleet Admiral Chester A. Nimitz to the Secretary of the Navy. At Truman’s request, Souers wrote a memorandum explaining his objections to a plan put forward by the State Department and why he thought the President would be better served by the arrangement proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His advocacy of the JCS plan, which became the basis for Truman’s directive, led the President to refer to it as “the Souers plan” on occasion.23 Souers was, said noted CIA historian Arthur Darling, “an influential voice.”4 As a short-term DCI—he had insisted on leaving as soon as the President and relevant Cabinet members could agree on a permanent successor—Souers had the task of getting the new Central Intelligence Group up and running. Given the sharp differences preceding the issuance of the presidential directive, it was a task that could not be rushed, and Souers avoided taking actions that might trigger a dispute or cause other players to dig in their heels. From the outset, Souers clearly saw the CIG as “a holding agency until a fully functional agency” could take over the intelligence mission,5 and, having completed the initial organization and planning,6 he left 1 Souers once told an interviewer that he was appalled when Truman was nominated for the Senate, noting that he would not have hired him in his own business for more than $250 a month. (“Notes on Early DCIs”). 2 For an in-depth treatment of Souer’s tenure as DCI, see the internal CIA history completed in 1953 by Arthur Darling. The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government, to 1950 was first publicly released by CIA in 1989 and was published the following year by The Pennsylvania State University Press. Souer’s tenure is also covered by the late Danny D. Jansen and Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones in “The Missouri Gang and the CIA,” a chapter in North American Spies: New Revisionist Essays, edited by Jeffreys-Jones and Andrew Lownie and published in 1991 by the University Press of Kansas. “Notes on the Early DCIs,” written by William Henhoeffer and James Hanrahan, released 13 September 2012. 3 Ralph E. Weber, Spymasters: Ten CIA Officers in Their Own Words (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Books, 1999), p. 2. 4 Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency, p. 68. 5 As Document 1946-03-21A demonstrates, the CIG’s dependence on other agencies for its budget and staff caused a wide range of problems, in this case a forced reliance on others for proper screening of personnel. Document 1946-03-27A suggests that Souers found this approach problematic.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 7 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.