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/specialCollection/SovietandWarsawPact/1961/1961-12-18.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 28 pages · text from the file's own layer

This Central Intelligence Agency memorandum to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, dated December 1961, sends a verbatim translation of a Soviet article from the TOP SECRET version of the journal Military Thought. The article, "The Theory of Military Art Needs Review" by Colonel-General A. Gastilovich, appeared in the first 1960 issue. It argues that nuclear missiles call for short "blitz" wars, smaller ground forces and missile troops as the main arm. It has no UFO content.

SE1 ET
100 such nuclear charges &toasted within a short period of tine on
an irdamirially developed. country whose territory is approalnately
300-500 thousand square kilometers sill be sufficient to convert
a/lof its InCaistrial arms and edninistrativerpolitical centers
into a hasp of rubble and the territory -- into a lifeless desert
coutaminated with deadly radioactive substences."
It must be clear to everyone that such statements are not made
for the sake of rhetoric, but are fully sUntentistod from the stand-
point of the achieventort of military technology and of the economic
capability of our country.
Ohdor coatemorery ccodItioos, the forestioos of missile troops
of the SOS (Supreme Rua COmmead), with their unlimited range of
action and calomel torn of fire 'WO*, One become theprinary
madam:1On fare of armed tones. They, rather themes:,other
neans Of armed conflict "pen the lay: if one my —use the expression,
for all other for of armed farces, radically changing the
strategic situation as a whole LA U* operational situation in the
theaters at military operations'.
‘•
Ito efforts of all otter forms of the armed forces
s
'Mich are
equipped with unclear/missile reopens, wet be directed toward
amine rapdAl and effective exploitation Of the strikes of missile
fcreetioes of the TOL In this ccenectice, the basis fa... planning
operations of each of the tn.* of forces loin becomes a gnostical
of the use of their WdD nuclear/Xdssile naves, and not of the
number of divisions, vessels, aircraft, etc.
Mathes. coseddnation it is already cospletely•emerent
ttat a 'hole series of astaaslislmadliamm of cur nillisury doctrine
moat be seriously remmuidsm4, begleming with gentians of strategy
awl operational art and ending with tactics and troop organisation.
Some Wastions of Btratainr
let us MAIM same questions concerning the initial period
of war. Zit us insoles I1O wittout two wtbree conatries 'Minh
lane been tine out of the war Winne of a powerful rearlear/
missile strike of formations at the or which One eves ceased
to at in the first days of the mar. %Isis, after all, •
\ apletely mi./attic perspective; lit se semmilber lacidents14,
that the area of etch such country Is stpailtioultay less than 300
Umiak's* spare kilemeters and several tens of large nuclear missiles
are sufficiest for its destruction. Saturally, such operation by

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 28 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.