Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency memorandum to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, dated December 1961, sends a verbatim translation of a Soviet article from the TOP SECRET version of the journal Military Thought. The article, "The Theory of Military Art Needs Review" by Colonel-General A. Gastilovich, appeared in the first 1960 issue. It argues that nuclear missiles call for short "blitz" wars, smaller ground forces and missile troops as the main arm. It has no UFO content.
-20- 1111111S RET •••• • especially massive, organised according to territorial character- let ice and trained without being pulled out of production. V. have something similxr nov in the form of civilian formations of the antiaircraft defews (*'V0). But these formetions exiat mostly an payer, are not supported from. material-techmical standpoint, are sani■valuntery organisations, and ars not properly directed by anyone. In addition, organs of the WO are concerned with a very large number of problems *Joh, in essence are the prerogatives of governmental authority, such as communications, supplying the popu- lation with iced, evacuation, etc. It appears to us that such very important undertakings as medical assistance to the suffering pcpulace and rehabilitative work., i.e., measures permitting the people to withstand enemy nuclear attack, must be implemented by special troops. Their cadres and necessary equipment must be maintained in peacetime and they must be assured mobilisstionel buildup under the leaderstir of aliens of military control with the initiation of military activities. ions nomof Control. the standpoint of the nature of control operations, the new forms of armed comflIct do not introduce any basic changes. As in the past there will be need for intelligence and collation of its informatice, an appraisal of the sitnation, • decision and its transmittal to executors supervision of execution, infloenCe on the course of events by, chaniing the tasks of subordinate troops, or through the influence of the senior commander's means smarted on the enemy, the Seaming of the commander and of adjacent units. &waver, the methods of control and the means by whinh they are implestented evanesce sienificant changes. The method of direct persooal contact in operations is of little value today. It can lead only to a mate of the senior commander's time and yrcecte incorrect decisions based upon impressions of OW center of combat operations. This method is admissible mow only in combat an a subunit level, but not in operations. The need to see the field of combat along the decisive direction also has little admissibility now. This need arose from crushing the eneny with masses of troops which were in direct content With his. Ibis vill not usually happen, soy. The met important thing in control is quick reaction to a change in the situstion, • rapid to of control, and, consequently, the veil-known need. for its mechanisatiou, automation, and reductien of
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 28 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.