/specialCollection/SovietandWarsawPact/1961/1961-12-18.pdf

for the enemy and as long es ground antiaircraft missile systems do
not possess a sufficient range of destruction.
In addition, the (rout needs a sanifoldtroop (army) aviation
for observation and recomnsissancs, including radiation, for liaison,
coma, and transport. Ouch aviation must undoubtedly develop as
non airfield-based. It may consist of helicopters and other flying
machines, for example the type well known in foreign literature under
the term "flying saucers" (grangleffect machine-turbolet).
The WS of the front mumt have a mach greater number of
reconnaissance aircraft than they have at present.
finally, greeter-capacity transport aviation is needed as a
resource of the Supreme litgh Cammuni.
The WS of the front (air army) is not desigastedvmder modern
conditions for the execution of amy indepanammt air operations, and
is the means for directly coordinated actici with eolhined-arms
armies. FOr tbts resew, their composition must InclUde several
aircraft divisions of fighter-bombers because only the latter are
-7- favorable for combat ageinst mobile carriers at unclear weapons and
4he advancing reserves of the enemy. In this connection, however,
it is inadvisable to distribute the WO forces at the front for
sump:at of definite armies or divisions; it is better to utilise
than centrally, under the jurisdiction of the 198 commander.
The . The future at see belongs to eabourinee and to
mIss -carrying seaplanes Which are not bound to airfields and which
are capable of long-range operations. These, it equldappear, should
nov be developed.
The basic mission of the fleet -- to annihilate carriers
muclearimissile Impact at sea Which as a 030184qUICCO Or the.i.r.
Mobility, have greater survival chances. Oudh carriers will be
nissile-aarrying aircraft and adasile-carrying atomic Submarines.
As a result of their high redhr-img, contrast ands cciaseiusntly,
their vulnerability aircraft carrion' and other surfed* vessels
apparently will soon depart frost the scene.
Under contemporary conditions it is hardly possible to imagine
large amphibious landing operations of an eperatiomaloand even less,
of strategic sighificance. A landing fort* is always, at some stage
of its activity, a compact group or it &ea not maks seams; bat this
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