Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency memorandum to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, dated December 1961, sends a verbatim translation of a Soviet article from the TOP SECRET version of the journal Military Thought. The article, "The Theory of Military Art Needs Review" by Colonel-General A. Gastilovich, appeared in the first 1960 issue. It argues that nuclear missiles call for short "blitz" wars, smaller ground forces and missile troops as the main arm. It has no UFO content.
“The Advance”5 pages
ir connection with this it is necessary, evidently, to re- examine our views on the nature of so-called counterpreparation (kontrpodgotovka) in defense and on organisation of counterstrikes. In these questions ye continue to proceed from the concept of the solid and relatively stable front. It appears to us that a limited quantity of nuclear weapons in the defense will not permit • breakup of the enemy offensive with one or two maesive nuclear strikes, especially since he will not form compact groupings for his offensive. Axarently, instead of counterpreparation, it will be necessary to restrict oneself to daily and rapid annihilation of disclosed enemy amens of nuclear attack and to individual (to the extent possible) nuclear strikes at various times on the most dangerous of his tank divisions which here broken through. If, however, the availability of nuclear Weapons permits the delivery of a massive strike capable of breaking up the enemy offensive ccmpletely„ then this is already not counter- preparation but going over tc! the offensive. I% is more expedient to carry out eounterstrikes in operational defense, by means of meeting engagements, not with a convect grouping especially created for this purpose and deployed on a definite line, but with several divisions operating simultaneously, though from different directions. Anti-debarkatica defense along the coast by ground troops can 4150 have no defensive zones either on the cast or in the zone of interior. In ports and in vulnerable landing sectors along the coast there can be separate tank subunits andumits designated basically for combat against airoosne landings and for initial repulsions of debarkations of the enemy in landing-debarkation craft. /he tests of anti-debarkation defense must be the maneuvering activities of large units which move %worms the interior of coastal zones andl in asetingengagements, pound the enemy utilizing nuclear wmpons. Of the now generally accepted mesa of anti-debarkation defense, only the ecnstruction at obstacles, both in the wetC7 as well as on the land, can achieve much sigrifloanee. Sway amphibious leullog operetices, while =roots at ea, do not it expensi.e and cumbersome operations ageinst them by the navy andldngsange aviation. The basis of their annihilation can 45- IlIksEdgq.
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 28 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.