/specialCollection/SovietandWarsawPact/1961/1961-12-18.pdf

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hostilities and desigrsted as reinforcemeut for the first echelon
during an oCieneive, but on the defensive - for counterattacks and
counterstrikes. To overcome eommy opposition during an offensive,
there should not be concentration of troops by bringing lathe
second echelon, but concentration of nuclear weapons end. their means
of delivery (aositel). Only when there is an insufficient quantity
of these means can s strike be undertaken by several divisions, and
then not with a compact striking group, but slither frau several
directions.
The possibility of enemy use of high-yield nuclear warheads in
the field of hostilities obliges even those small groupings, of
division sine as we mentionek to operate at a distance of 20 to 140
or more kilometers from each other or, as vs frequently point out,
to operate in separate . direction.
Doreover, the inclinational each advancing large unit to lend
assistance to its neighbor, to Wheel rapidly if anceamary in a mew
direction fee a strike wind the gamey rear is a Undies principle
of coordinstot action.
Theretore the cooanct of offensive operstions nom requires a
significantly lesser operational density but a larger member a tank
divisions in the first echelon. Divisions located in the some at
interior and movies up -- are not the secant echelon but rather,
reserves designated as replacements for decimated divisions of the
first echelon and fOr the cisvmmmention ce all types of obstacles.
It is necessary to reject decisively the inclinstion developed
in previoss mart toward encirelement of separate groupdnge and the
formation of rings around them. This tendency is very viable and
has remained with us .es an inheritance tram the period uhen there
were no other methods for arnihilatien of the enemyleft in the rear
of adVancing troops. lowedays, the enemy left lathe rear snot be
destroyed either in meeting engsissaata by reserve large units and
• its or if st.tiomary, thwy must be annihilwhmi with thelear strikes.
2be Utter, of course, is ;estimable.
ID the training of troops, it is neeessary also to reject ileciedve-
ly cultivation of the principle of break through the enemy's
• prepared defenses. It le possible, or course, in individual .
instances 'ben the enemy defense cammot be bypassed or sonibileted
by nuclear strike. In the lain, bower, under conditions not in-
volving solid fronts or heated battles, the breektluou0 of an snen7
/ prepareddefenee has ceased -to be the primary fora of Offensive