/specialCollection/SovietandWarsawPact/1961/1961-12-18.pdf

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instances when the letter, for one reason or another, found them-
selves vithout sufficient nuclear /missile veepons. Strikes in the
imterests of separate fronts could be carried out either on command
of the Starke (or the command of theater forces) or upo p requests
of the fronts within the range of prescribed limitations.
At the sane time, this Y L..ile formstion can carry out
separate tasks assigned by the Reeks which are not direct)" connected
with the activities of the fronts.
In all instances the VOK ova-stimuli *Wile fommetion must have
at its disposal its awn long-range means of reconnaissance (aviation,
radlotechnical, and others), in order to be able to respond tepidly
to a change in the satiation *mato avoid aulti-chennal coordinstiams
at re...onomiasance tasks.-
It appears egpedift... to es to plan the MK missile operatic=
as special operetioes for the destruction or seamy guess: weapons,
tor Insimnittnimbls economic potential, for combat spinet supply,
etc. All this mast be a canstituant pert of two types at missile
• operations: those operations carried out by the VQK missile troop
formations with the aim at complete annihilation of an enemy country
aad knocking it out of the war, or operations in support of ground
troop. Missile operations of the first type usually mast precede
operations of the second type end, sulreguently, are also carried,
out simeltansovaly. It is obvious that the nature of the targets
ender attack will be different in each type at operation.
It is aleubstely mrmecesssry to deployMaissile tormaticma,
in coardinsted, action with ;roma troops, directly in the theater of
military activities or close to it. On the castrary, their placement
in the sone of interior is even prate:Tel:les, since this makes the
work. of 'mem intelligence more difficult sad negates the need to
fora s separate antiaircraft defense of these formation') their WO
can be combined with the amtiaircruft defense of certain areas of
the country.
The gam:atlas at VOCelesile operations, the possibility of
similar strikesby the smog, the repletion of groodtroops with
their owe arsenic unclear/missile Imams, amd.thepossililiky of using
kish-yield mealear varkeeds, not only in the sans of interior, hut
in empeggemm$s and even on the field at battle, deems& thoweagb
review of certain postulates of oar military doctrine In commotion
with the operaticas at ground troops.
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