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/specialCollection/SovietandWarsawPact/1961/1961-12-18.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 28 pages · text from the file's own layer

This Central Intelligence Agency memorandum to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, dated December 1961, sends a verbatim translation of a Soviet article from the TOP SECRET version of the journal Military Thought. The article, "The Theory of Military Art Needs Review" by Colonel-General A. Gastilovich, appeared in the first 1960 issue. It argues that nuclear missiles call for short "blitz" wars, smaller ground forces and missile troops as the main arm. It has no UFO content.

-9-
allISFIRET
\,...
41110 ST :RI:i
occupational functioos in Um occupied territory will be required.,
A significant nuMber of forces will also be needed in the cone of
interior Chiefly for various formaticos such as local antiaircraft
defense ('v0). Therefore, for the conduct of the var A sufficiently
large number of ground troops is needled, 'aut . their.emer-ell site
designation anCoature of use will of course be different than 11
past vars.
The oumber of ground troops .get directly in combat operatic=
maybe, as it appears to us, MOW times smaller than it vas in
previous vars.
We have outlined a concept for initial operations leader
Europese Theater conditions which le convenient for the activities
of all arms of troops. To the owes degree, with certain corrections
for geographical coalitions, it_can also be applied in other theaters.
In this concept, the prIncipal leading role belongs to the operation's
of the =missile forsatib
a
es but not with the ales which we mow
have under samar review. This is not cost against owner =clear
esepoes, not the weakening of his ecommic potential, not combat
agplast his reserves, etc., but the tall annihilation of the ...mr
with mucleer varbseds of mega= yield over a net territory 'with
the sin of knodeles entire countries out of the var.
Bristly, if there is a possibility for holding out, then there
Li also a possibility of victory in a short period of time. lbreover,
tor direct west operations at the front such numerous ground envoi
forces as inglorious wars will be needed neither in the beginning
of the vow mar during its course.
Certain Questions of Operstienel Art
It is necessary to examine the current operations of wooed
troops In close commotion with the operations of =missile formations.
It appear* to us that among the ranks of the latter, In addition to
fcanationo carrying out the missions of inmates entire countries
Olt of the war, there most he formations desigsated for activities •
in the interest of several trouts emanating operations an ems stra-
tegic axis. Onah formations remaining under the jurisdiction ant
sostivartirs (etavka), eclat! eatabliali favorable
conditions tor the devalepnent-of wooed troop operations a7 gem
• of annihilation of' enemy anclaer weapons, his reserves, airfields,
tramp:station epitome, depot., *slather imstalletiaim located
Wealth. range of action of frost adman. weapoes; Withal,: strikes
they could also reinforce the fire capability of the treats in these
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 28 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.