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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1961/1961-04-25.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 101 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-61, Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 25 April 1961. The estimate assesses Soviet surface-to-air, antimissile, air-to-air, air-to-surface, ballistic, ICBM, naval and space programs. It concludes that the first Soviet ICBM unit was probably operational around 1 January 1960. It also says there is no evidence the Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. It contains no UFO material.

  • p. 4 …ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL 49 ANNEX D: SUMMARY TABLES OF PROBABLE SOVIET MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 51
  • p. 81 …Since 1955, the USSR has intensified its physiological research on the control of en- vironmental stress…
  • p. 93 …also significant variations of control depending upon the type and mission of the weapons system considered…
  • p. 94 …This division of responsibility seems to be based upon the mission of the particular missile system…
Summary Table IV
PROBABLE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR GROUND-LAUNCHED SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS •
Arbitrary Reference
Designation
Initial Opera-
tional Capability
Date b
Maxi-
,mum
Opera-
tionel
Range
Guidance
Operational
Accuracy
(CEP) 4
Maximum War-
head •
(lbs. and type)
REMARKS
SS-1 (SCUD)
SS-2
SS-3 (SHYSTER)
SS-4 ...
SS-5
SS-6
1957
1954
1956
Late 1958
Early 1959.
Late 1961 or 1st
half 1962.
1 Jan. 1060 h
Mid-1960 h
150
350
700
1,100
2,000
5,000
7,000
Probably Radio inertial
but possibly all-bier-
tin,.
Radar track-radio corn-
mand.
Radio/inertial
Radio/inertial
.
Radio/inertial
Radio/inertial
3r urn
3/4" min
1 ii.rn
134 nut
134 ;Lin. or
better.
1961-2 n.m. 1 .
1,500 HE. Nu-
clear, CW.
2000, HE, Nu-
clear, CI'.
3,000 Nuclear...
3.000 Nuclear...
-1,000 Nuclear...
6,000-10,000....
8.000 Nuclear...
. Storable liquid fuel. Mobile in fueled
condition.
13elic ved to be outgrowth of V-2, improved
in range and accuracy. Road mobile.
Road mobile.
Road mobile.
Probably fixed sites.
Heav y nosccone version.
Lighter nosecone version.
Footnotes for Summary Table IV.
OTHER: Considering general Soviet progress in the inissila field, we believe that for several years the USSR .hits had t:le capability of making close support
missiles available to ground force units. Such missiles could include: (n) a single stage missile with a range of about 5,000 to 6,000 yards, capable of delivering
a shaped HE charge against tanks or other hard targets; (b) missiles with improved simplified inertial guidance compont-nts capable of delivering a 500 pound
payload to ranges on the order of 5 to 15 n.m. We estimate that the first of these missiles probably has been developed and is now operational.
We believe that the Soviets' are developing and could have available for operational use by 1002-1063, a ground-launched ram-jet propelled vehicle with a
speed of about Mach 3, a flight altitude of about 70,000 feet, and a range in excess of 4,000 n.m.
In the time period 1961-1970 the Soviets will probably have under development follow-on ballistic missile systems. Desirable characteristics for such systems
might include fast reaction times, storable liquid or solid propellants, Improved guidance systems and greater flexibility. We would expect the Soviets to follow
established development patterns by depending on proven components, simplicity, and high reliability.

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 101 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.