Documents / FOIA release
This is National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-61, Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 25 April 1961. The estimate assesses Soviet surface-to-air, antimissile, air-to-air, air-to-surface, ballistic, ICBM, naval and space programs. It concludes that the first Soviet ICBM unit was probably operational around 1 January 1960. It also says there is no evidence the Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. It contains no UFO material.
“National Academy of Sciences”1 page
600278407 ANNEX C ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL 1. There is inconclusive evidence concerning the Soviet organizations responsible for devel- oping and producing hardware, constructing operational facilities, and training personnel to operate guided missile weapons systems. Our view of these is based largely upon our general knowledge of Soviet organization, practices, and relationships in dealing with military and civilian programs. Other than Soviet, statements, there is even less specific information, although there are useful analo- gies in the Soviet military concerning the com- mand structure which controls the employ- ment of guided missile forces. 2. Decisions concerning major programs upon which the strategic goals of the regime depend are highly centralized at the level of the in- terlocking directorate formed by the Presid- ium of the Central Committee of the Com- munist Party and the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers. The Party Presidium makes the policy decisions on the missile weapons systems with which the Soviet armed forces are to be equipped and on the overall resource requirements to be devoted to the guided missile program. The Presidium ex- ercises close supervision over the organizations responsible for translating its decisions into military capabilities and approves such major adjustments in the program as may seem necessary in the light of technological develop- ments and ;changes in the Presidium's strate- gic goals. Ultimate responsibility for control of forces using guided missiles also is centered in the Party Presidium. The mechanism for operational control of military forces is dis- tinct from but closely coordinated with that required to develop, produce, and deliver all the elements of the missile weapons system. Throughout the operational organization and command channels, there are also significant variations of control depending upon the type and mission of the weapons system considered. Z. Tho staff of several organizations pro- vides the basis for the . Presidium's decisions on the composition of the guided missiles pro- gram which will . serve its strategic goals and on the relative priorities to be assigned the individual missile systems. The Ministry of Defense is the principal source of proposals for weapons systems. The Academy of Sciences provides supplementary proposals and re- search programs designed to advance the state-of-the-art. The USSR State Planning Committee, the USSR State Scientific Eco- nomic Council, and the Ministry of Finance work out estimates of the resource and fund- ing requirements of alternative programs and their implications for other major economic and political goals of the Presidium. When the Presidium reaches its decision, these cen- tral planning and financial organs incorporate the missile program into the overall economic and financial plans. Detailed implementa- tion of development, production, and construc- tion schedules is carried out by the economic bureaucracy of the Soviet Government. 4. Translating the policy decisions on a guided missile program into complete weapons sys- tems in the hands of troops requires a well-co- ordinated effort to develop and produce the missiles, guidance, ground support equipment, fuels, and warheads, to construct the launch and support facilities, and to train the troops. Given the current administrative structure of the Soviet economy, the complexity of the problem, and the competing nature of the priorities among various weapons systems, it is likely that a special executive authority within the Council of Ministers is responsible for implementing the guided missile weapons program approved by the Presidium. Such TOP C-ECREIT 49
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 101 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.