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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1961/1961-04-25.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 101 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-61, Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 25 April 1961. The estimate assesses Soviet surface-to-air, antimissile, air-to-air, air-to-surface, ballistic, ICBM, naval and space programs. It concludes that the first Soviet ICBM unit was probably operational around 1 January 1960. It also says there is no evidence the Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. It contains no UFO material.

  • p. 79 …The first attempt to launch a Venus probe succeeded in orbiting the earth satellite, Sputnik VII…
  • p. 81 …Unmanned Earth Satellites. Earth satellite vehicles offer significant advances over conventional techniques for acquiring information on…
  • p. 83 …Unmanned Earth Orbiting Flight: 15,000-20,000 pounds, low orbit Military satellites Communications Weather surveillance…
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the exploration of the lunar surface. The
size and weight of this vehicle, which the So-
viets call a Tankette, would require a launch-
ing booster much larger than now available.
Its soft landing, using an advanced launching
vehicle of about five million pounds thrust
probably could not be accomplished before
about 1965 (see paragraph 157, page 41).
172. Manned Earth Orbiting Flight. The So-
viets have now successfully demonstrated
their capability to orbit and recover a manned
earth satellite. Additional missions of this
type piobably Wl11 be undertaken duiirigth
next year or so. We believe that future
manned re-entry vehicles will be made more
maneuverable in order to exploit the advan-
tages which glide-type vehicles offer over the
capsule-type vehicles currently being used. A
manned glide-type recovery vehicle could be
demonstrated, at the earliest, during 1963.
We believe that by 1963 the Soviets could with
conventional propellants have the capability
to make limited angular or altitude changes
in the 'path of manned earth satellite vehicles
outside the atmosphere. As the payload-in-
orbit capability increases, the capability to
make repeated path changes can be expected.
In about 1965, increased maneuverability of
the vehicle should permit the Soviets to effect
rendezvous with an earth orbiting vehicle.
173.Advanced earth orbiting space stations
suitable for sustaining life and for performing
scientific or military functions for extended
periods of time (several months or more) are
believed to be a part of the Soviet program.
These stations would have to be able to keep
their positions as well as make minor adjust-
ments in position as desired. We estimate
that a large, long-lived space platform weigh-
ing on the order of 50-100 tons could be
established about 1968-1970, barring the ex-
istence of unforeseen space hazards which
preclude it.
174. Manned Lunar Flights. Contingent
upon successes with manned earth satellites
and the development of large booster vehicles,
the Soviets are believed capable of a manned
circumlunar flight with reasonable chance
of success in 1966; of recoverable manned
lunar satellites in 1967; and of lunar landings
cult; teLUrn to earth by about 1970. Mesc are
all estimated to be the earliest possible dates.
Offensive Space Weapons
175. There is no evidence that the Soviets
are developing offensive space wezspons. How-
ever, some of the Soviet achievements in space
would be necessary initial steps in the devel-
opment of space weapons, and the Soviets
have undoubtedly undertaken studies and re-
search in this area. Soviet success in space
as exemplified by the Venus probe, the most
recent successful orbiting and recovery of a
man, and the capability to orbit still heavier
payloads over the next few years, leads to the
conclusion that the Soviets are technically -
capable of achieving an orbital bombardment
vehicle toward the end of the period of this
estimate. Moreover, the Soviet leaders might
seek to derive some psychological or political
advantage by hinting or even boasting that
the USSR had a significant capability in space
weapons. The launching of vehicles for
which the Soviets claimed a military capability
or other Soviet arhievements in space could
lend credence to such claims.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 101 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.