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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1961/1961-04-25.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 101 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-61, Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 25 April 1961. The estimate assesses Soviet surface-to-air, antimissile, air-to-air, air-to-surface, ballistic, ICBM, naval and space programs. It concludes that the first Soviet ICBM unit was probably operational around 1 January 1960. It also says there is no evidence the Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. It contains no UFO material.

  • p. 79 …The first attempt to launch a Venus probe succeeded in orbiting the earth satellite, Sputnik VII…
  • p. 81 …Unmanned Earth Satellites. Earth satellite vehicles offer significant advances over conventional techniques for acquiring information on…
  • p. 83 …Unmanned Earth Orbiting Flight: 15,000-20,000 pounds, low orbit Military satellites Communications Weather surveillance…
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shchev has alluded to plans for orbiting pay-
loads of this magnitude.
158. Structures. The design and construc-
tion of the Luniks and the Sputniks, as dis-
played or otherwise publicized by the Soviets,
indicate that relatively heavy structural de-
sign and fabrication techniques are used in
the design of their space vehicles. The avail-
ability of high thrust launching vehicles has
permitted the use of these heavy structures
and of equipment which is probably not minia-
turized. This in turn provides some benefit
with respect to Llie puixni.iai reliability ofd a
space system and its instrumentation.
159. Re-entry. In the area of re-entry, the
Soviets appear to have made major strides dur-
ing 1960 and 1961 in both ICBM nosecones
and space vehicles. The Soviets have demon-
strated that they now have adequate materials
and techniques to protect space vehicles dur-
ing re-entry into the atmosphere and to ac-
complish successful landings.
160. Payload Instruments. The Soviets have
developed and successfully demonstrated ex-
tensive and complex instrumentation for their
earth satellite and lunar space vehicles.
Because of the USSR's large payload capa-
bility, we do not believe miniaturization has
been a prime requirement for Soviet space
instrumentation design to date. This has
been supported by analysis of the space equip-
ment which has been publicly displayed by
the Soviets. However, as mission require-
ments increase, the Soviets will be required
to attend more to the question of component
miniaturization. Improvement of the photo-
graphic system used in Lunik III is expected
to continue and similar techniques could be
utilized in weather and possibly photographic
reconnaissance satellites and in photography
of other planets.
161. Tracking and Surveillance Systems. The
extensive system used by the Soviets to track
space vehicles, including optical observatories,
radio telescopes, photographic stations, radars,
radio direction-finders, and int6rferometers,
appears to give them the capability for space
tracking and surveillance from within their
own borders. This capability is supplemented
and extended mainly by ships at sea with
some assistance from other Soviet Bloc and
Western countries and from Soviet stations
in the Antarctic. However, the Soviets lack
the worldwide facilities available to the West.
The recent effort to initiate negotiations for
a tracking facility in Australia indicates a So-
viet desire to extend their present system.
We cannot estimate how many missions
could be handled simultaneously; to date the
Soviets have not demonstrated a capability
for detailed tracking and readout on More
than two objects at a time.
Major Basic and Applied Research Areas
162. We have estimated that payloads on the
order of 50-100 tons will become possible in
the latter half of the decade. The missions
which can then be accommodated would po-
tentially be capable of prolonged flight and
changes in flight path long after initial in-
jection into space. However, such mission
capabilities would require further extensive
research and technological advances in sev-
eral key areas.
163.The Soviets are aware of the advantages
offered by nuclear rocket engines for space --
use, and very limited evidence indicates that
they are engaged in nuclear rocket engine
development. We estimate that the first
static test firing of a prototype system for
upper stage use or space maneuvering could
be made as early as 1965, and that test flights
could begin before 1970.
164.At present the small internal power re-
quirements for space payloads are being met
by the use of chemical batteries and solar
cells. However, increased demands for elec-
trical power are expected to arise in the 1965
to 1970 time period. Ecological life support
systems will require greatly increased power,
,, and extremely heavy demands would be im-
posed by electric or plasma propulsion sys-
tems. These demands could be met by nu-
clear power sources, and there is evidence of
work being done in this field. The Soviets
also recognize the propellant weight advan-
tage afforded by electric and plasma space pro-
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 101 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.