Documents / FOIA release
This is National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-61, Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 25 April 1961. The estimate assesses Soviet surface-to-air, antimissile, air-to-air, air-to-surface, ballistic, ICBM, naval and space programs. It concludes that the first Soviet ICBM unit was probably operational around 1 January 1960. It also says there is no evidence the Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. It contains no UFO material.
“Low Earth orbit”3 pages
R E 41 Mars. In February 1961, the Soviets at- tempted with Sputnik VII to launch a probe toward Venus from an orbiting satellite, and succeeded later in the month with Sputnik VIII. 152. The reliability achieved in Soviet space shots has been much lower than that of the Soviet ICBM. Most space failures were ap- parently caused by factors unique to the space program, such as the addition of upper stages to the basic booster and in some cases the re- quirement to launch at stipulated times. The Soviets have achieved i4 uccessful la.unchings. of space vehicles., but we believe that there have been nearly as many launchings which resulted in failures. Moreover, several of the vehicles which were successfully launched ap- parently did not function as planned. Lunik I, , which was prohably intended to hit. the moon, missed by a wide margin and went into orbit around the sun. The recovery system contained in Sputniks IV and VI failed to function successfully. The first attempt to launch a Venus probe succeeded in orbiting the earth satellite, Sputnik VII from which the probe was to be launched, but failed during injection into the trajectory towards Venus. 153.The Soviets desire to accomplish dra- matic "firsts" is probably another factor in the relatively low reliability of their space shots. They have undertaken some very challenging operations, and in their lunar and planetary shots have shown a tendency to move on to the next challenge once a given type of operation is successfully demonstrated. This approach has contributed to the impres- sive Soviet record in pioneering space achieve- ments. There is evidence from public and private statements, however, that some Soviet scientists have been concerned lest political goals interfere with sound scientific progress. Launching Facilities 154.Both of the major Soviet ballistic missile test ranges have been involved in the space program. Since 1954, about 25 vertical firings have been detected at the Kapustin Yar range. According to the Soviets, the purposes of such firings have included upper atmosphere re- search, sodium vapor ejection, photographing the earth's cloud cover, and space biology in- cluding the recovery of live animals. All launchings of earth satellites and space probes have taken place at Tyuratam. Although the majority of the launchings here have involved ICBM tests, there are indications that Tyu- ratam was designed with the space program clearly in mind. The facilities at launch areas "A" and "B" are of a size and design which could probably handle vehicles with thrusts on the order of several million pounds. Tyuratam should thus be able to sat:sfy ground handling and launching facility re- quirements for much of the Soviet space pro- gram over the next 10 years. 155. Propulsion. All earth satellites and lunar vehicles, with the possible exception of Sputniks I and II, are believed to have used the same basic launching vehicle as the ICBM. One additional upper stage was added for the launching of the Lunilcs and Sputniks IV, V, VI, IX, X, and XI. Two upper stages were apparently added to the basic booster in the successful Venus shot—one of them to place Sputnik VIII into orbit around the earth and the other to power that portion of the satel- lite which entered a trajectory towards the planet. 156.The data available on the Venus shot indicates that with one additional stage the Soviet ICBM booster placed about 14,000 pounds into orbit around the earth. This is the largest payload the Soviets have succeeded in orbiting. We expect additional increases in launching vehicle capability through further improvements in staging and the use of improved fuels, which could increase the orbital payload to about 25,000 pounds in about 1962. 157.A new rocket engine, which may deliver 1 to 2 V2 million pounds of thrust, could be available for first flight in about 1963. Intelli- gence on a new rocket engine test facility near Kuybyshev indicates that the Soviets are ac- tively developing such an engine. Clustering of two to five of these engines, which could probably be achieved in 1965-1970, would re- sult in a booster capable of orbiting payloads of 50 to 100 tons. On several occasions, Khru-
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 101 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.