Documents / FOIA release
This is National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-61, Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 25 April 1961. The estimate assesses Soviet surface-to-air, antimissile, air-to-air, air-to-surface, ballistic, ICBM, naval and space programs. It concludes that the first Soviet ICBM unit was probably operational around 1 January 1960. It also says there is no evidence the Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. It contains no UFO material.
“The Advance”10 pages
C00278407 '1' 0 P----S-B-G-R B T 34 VIII. SPACE PROGRAM 147. The Soviet leaders clearly believe that achievements in space enable them to per- suade the world that in the realms of science, technology, and military strength, the USSR stands in the very front rank of world powers. In seizing an early lead and following it with a series of dramatic successes, they have sought to bolster, both at home and abroad, their claims of the superiority of the Soviet system. The USSR has sought to maximize the impact of its achi r.-vement with spectacu- lar "firsts," on occasion timed to coinciae with international political moves. Intervening shots appear to have been designed largely to provide data for these "firsts." 148. Since 1955, the announced goal of the Soviet space program has been manned inter- planetary travel. Many of the Soviet space activities to date, culminating in the recent manned satellite, have in one way or another contributed to progress toward this eventual goal. While the Soviet space shots have col- lected scientific data, the scientific aspects of the program seem to have been fairly selective, and to a large degree applicable to the support of future Soviet space missions. 149.We have no direct evidence on the pri- ority of the Soviet space program relative to that of the military missile program. The two programs have used the same basic launching vehicles and shared the same launching facilities; to an extent, they have been mutually supporting. To date the USSR has apparently not launched any space ve- hicles specifically for military purposes, and we have no present evidence pointing to such a Soviet intention. However, many of their space experiments have produced information which would be useful in the development of future military space systems. It would be technically feasible at present for the Soviets to equip earth satellites for such military sup- port roles as communications, reconnaissance, navigation, or collection of weather data. Their present satellites possess the attributes of payload, stabilization, and recoverability sufficient for such missions. We estimate that they could appear at any time. Soviet Achievements in Space 150. The importance which the Soviets attach to the space program is demonstrated by the assignment of leading scientists to its direc- tion, by the wealth of theoretical and applied research being conducted in its support, and by the allocation of resources and facilities to its implementation. Space vehicles have constituted more than one-third of the total number of launchings from Tyuratam in the past 3 4 years. The impressive Soviet record now includes: orbiting of the world's first eai b-y- far the largest satellites; launching of the first vehicles to impact the moon and to photograph the reverse side of the moon; launching of the first vehicle to transfer from earth orbit to a trajectory towards a planet; orbiting and recovery of the only earth satellites suitable for suspporting manned orbital flight; and, most recently, the successful orbiting and recovery of a man. 151.Four distinct phases can be discerned in the Soviet space program to date: a. Sputniks I, II, and III, launched in 1957' and 1958, were instrumented satellites de- signed to collect data on space near the earth and, in the case of Sputnik II which contained a dog, to provide some biological data (see Figure 34). b. Luniks I, II, and III, launched during 1959, were all instrumented to collect data on space between the earth and the moon and with respect to the moon itself (see Figure 35). c. The Soviet effort to put a man in space led in 1960 and 1961 GO the orbiting of six heavy satellites. Five of these, Sputniks IV, V, VI, IX, and X, each probably contained a life support system suitable for man and equipment designed for his recovery. Sput- nik V (see Figure 36) was successfully recovered in August 1960; Sputniks IX and X in March 1961. This effort culminated in 'April 1961 with the successful orbiting and recovery of a man in Sputnik XI. d. The Soviet effort to launch an inter- planetary probe probably began in October 1960 with what appear to have been two un- successful attempts to launch a probe toward
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 101 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.