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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1961/1961-04-25.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 101 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-61, Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 25 April 1961. The estimate assesses Soviet surface-to-air, antimissile, air-to-air, air-to-surface, ballistic, ICBM, naval and space programs. It concludes that the first Soviet ICBM unit was probably operational around 1 January 1960. It also says there is no evidence the Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. It contains no UFO material.

  • p. 79 …The first attempt to launch a Venus probe succeeded in orbiting the earth satellite, Sputnik VII…
  • p. 81 …Unmanned Earth Satellites. Earth satellite vehicles offer significant advances over conventional techniques for acquiring information on…
  • p. 83 …Unmanned Earth Orbiting Flight: 15,000-20,000 pounds, low orbit Military satellites Communications Weather surveillance…
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'1' 0 P----S-B-G-R B T 34
VIII. SPACE PROGRAM
147. The Soviet leaders clearly believe that
achievements in space enable them to per-
suade the world that in the realms of science,
technology, and military strength, the USSR
stands in the very front rank of world powers.
In seizing an early lead and following it with
a series of dramatic successes, they have
sought to bolster, both at home and abroad,
their claims of the superiority of the Soviet
system. The USSR has sought to maximize
the impact of its achi r.-vement with spectacu-
lar "firsts," on occasion timed to coinciae with
international political moves. Intervening
shots appear to have been designed largely
to provide data for these "firsts."
148. Since 1955, the announced goal of the
Soviet space program has been manned inter-
planetary travel. Many of the Soviet space
activities to date, culminating in the recent
manned satellite, have in one way or another
contributed to progress toward this eventual
goal. While the Soviet space shots have col-
lected scientific data, the scientific aspects of
the program seem to have been fairly selective,
and to a large degree applicable to the support
of future Soviet space missions.
149.We have no direct evidence on the pri-
ority of the Soviet space program relative to
that of the military missile program. The
two programs have used the same basic
launching vehicles and shared the same
launching facilities; to an extent, they have
been mutually supporting. To date the USSR
has apparently not launched any space ve-
hicles specifically for military purposes, and
we have no present evidence pointing to such
a Soviet intention. However, many of their
space experiments have produced information
which would be useful in the development of
future military space systems. It would be
technically feasible at present for the Soviets
to equip earth satellites for such military sup-
port roles as communications, reconnaissance,
navigation, or collection of weather data.
Their present satellites possess the attributes
of payload, stabilization, and recoverability
sufficient for such missions. We estimate
that they could appear at any time.
Soviet Achievements in Space
150. The importance which the Soviets attach
to the space program is demonstrated by the
assignment of leading scientists to its direc-
tion, by the wealth of theoretical and applied
research being conducted in its support, and
by the allocation of resources and facilities
to its implementation. Space vehicles have
constituted more than one-third of the total
number of launchings from Tyuratam in the
past 3 4 years. The impressive Soviet record
now includes: orbiting of the world's first
eai b-y- far the largest satellites;
launching of the first vehicles to impact the
moon and to photograph the reverse side of
the moon; launching of the first vehicle to
transfer from earth orbit to a trajectory
towards a planet; orbiting and recovery of the
only earth satellites suitable for suspporting
manned orbital flight; and, most recently, the
successful orbiting and recovery of a man.
151.Four distinct phases can be discerned in
the Soviet space program to date:
a. Sputniks I, II, and III, launched in 1957'
and 1958, were instrumented satellites de-
signed to collect data on space near the earth
and, in the case of Sputnik II which contained
a dog, to provide some biological data (see
Figure 34).
b. Luniks I, II, and III, launched during
1959, were all instrumented to collect data on
space between the earth and the moon and
with respect to the moon itself (see Figure
35).
c. The Soviet effort to put a man in space
led in 1960 and 1961 GO the orbiting of six
heavy satellites. Five of these, Sputniks IV,
V, VI, IX, and X, each probably contained
a life support system suitable for man and
equipment designed for his recovery. Sput-
nik V (see Figure 36) was successfully
recovered in August 1960; Sputniks IX and
X in March 1961. This effort culminated in
'April 1961 with the successful orbiting and
recovery of a man in Sputnik XI.
d. The Soviet effort to launch an inter-
planetary probe probably began in October
1960 with what appear to have been two un-
successful attempts to launch a probe toward

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 101 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.