/specialCollection/MissileGap/1961/1961-04-25.pdf

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of our estimates of the operational avail-
ability and the general characteristics of
Soviet missiles. We have less confidence
in our estimates of their accuracy, reli-
ability, and reaction time. We have little
direct evidence on Soviet programs for
operational deployment except for the
surface-to-air systems and certain air-to-
surface weapons, and even less concern-
ing missile production.
Surface-to-Air Missiles
4. Since late 1957 the Soviets have de-
ployed extensively a flexible and mobile
surface-to-air missile system (SA-2)
which appears to be the mainstay of the
Soviet missile defense system against air-
craft. The early Moscow system (SA-1)
has been bolstered by the addition of SA-2
sites, and possibly by the introduction of
the more effective SA-2 missile (GUIDE-
LINE). Both systems are capable of in-
terceptions at medium and high altitudes
up to 60,000 feet and would have some
capability up to about 80,000 feet, particu-
larly if nuclear warheads were employed.
(Paras. 29-46)
5. In view of the widespread deployment
of the SA-2, and its potentialities for
further improvement, we consider it very
unlikely that the Soviets will develop an
entirely new system to improve their ca-
pabilities against aircraft and air-to-sur-
face missiles flying at medium and high
altitudes. However, neither the SA-1 nor
the SA-2 appears to have been designed or
sited to coite with low level attacks. We
estimate that in 1961 the Soviets will have
available for initial deployment a surface-
to-air system (SA-3) specifically designed
for medium and low altitude coverage of
targets down to about 50 feet. (Paras.
47-48)
Antimissile Program
6. There is firm evidence that the Soviets
have had under way for several years an
extensive and high priority program for
the development of defenses against bal-
listic missiles. This effort is apparently
directed toward development of a termi-
nal intercept system. It is possible that
the widespread and diverse Soviet ac-
tivities which we have observed represent
developmental . programs on more than
one type of antimissile system. The fixed
nature of the installations and the gen-
eral progression of activities towards work
with longer range missiles leads us to
believe that the main effort has been di-
rected toward defense against rRBMs and
ICBMs. (Paras. 49-57)1
7. We have no basis for a firm estimate
for the date of first operational deploy-
ment of a Soviet antiballistic missile sys-
tem or of its effectiveness against the
various types of Western ballistic missiles.
The timing of first deployment will be de-
termined by the nature of the system--
under development, the status of the test-
ing program, its future progress, and the
timing of the Soviet decision to deploy.
We believe that for political as well as
military reasons, the Soviets would wish
to deploy antimissile defenses for the pro-
tection of a few critical areas, even if the
available system provided only an interim,
limited capability. (Paras. 58-59)
8. In the light of these factors and the
intensive Soviet research and develop-
ment activities, we estimate that in the
• The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. De-
partment of the Army, believes that the available
evidence permits more detailed understanding and
estimates of the antimissile systems under develop-
ment at Sary Shagan and Uka than are reflected
in this estimate. See his footnote to paragraph 57,
page 14.