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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1961/1961-04-25.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 101 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-61, Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 25 April 1961. The estimate assesses Soviet surface-to-air, antimissile, air-to-air, air-to-surface, ballistic, ICBM, naval and space programs. It concludes that the first Soviet ICBM unit was probably operational around 1 January 1960. It also says there is no evidence the Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. It contains no UFO material.

  • p. 15 …At the test range, the Soviets have fol- lowed a generally similar pattern in the de…
  • p. 33 …We believe that at the present time, the Soviets are well advanced in a program to…
  • p. 57 …the Soviet state of the art in re-entry techniques at that time. Subsequent advances in…
  • p. 58 …specific time designated well in advance, i.e., maximum readiness. The ready missile rate is expected…
  • p. 66 …program for developing advanced ASW weap- ons systems exists. The USSR has the basic scientific and…
  • p. 80 …technological advances in sev- eral key areas. 163.The Soviets are aware of the advantages offered…
  • p. 81 …The caliber of the Soviet work to date indicates that the USSR is among world leaders…
  • p. 82 …the vehicle should permit the Soviets to effect rendezvous with an earth orbiting vehicle. 173.Advanced…
  • p. 91 …We estimate the SS-6, and probably the SS-5, will probably utilize fixed sites. The…
  • p. 93 …The Academy of Sciences provides supplementary proposals and re- search programs designed to advance the state…
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ballistic missiles of the type carried by the
"Z" class conversion. For missile launching,
both the converted "Z" and the "G" class sub-
marines would need to be surfaced, or more
likely with the sail awash. Since it has not
been established that the fairing doors con-
ceal ballistic missile tubes, the possibility can-
not be excluded that the "G" class is equipped
with cruise-type missiles.
146. We believe that Soviet planners would
consider it operationally desirable to have nu-
clear-powered submarines capable of launch-
ing. ballist4 missiles, preferably while sub-
merged. There is some evidence which sug-
gests an active development program, and
we believe that such a program probably is
underway. We estimate that Soviet nuclear-
powered submarines, each capable of carrying
and launching while submerged 6-12 ballistic
missiles of 500-1,000 n.m. range could become
operational in 1962-1963. This system would
require a new missile using either solid pro-
pellant or storable liquid fuel. We estimate
that it would carry a 1,000 pound warhead and
have a CEP of one to three n.m. We would
expect that this missile (SS-N-5) would be
tested at Kapustin Yar, that E
we would be able to identify it as a new missil
and that approximately 18 months of testing
would be required before It could become op-
erational. It is possible that the Soviets have
elected to equip nuclear submarines with sur-
face-launched ballistid missiles of the type
attributed to the converted "Z" and "G"
classes. If this is the case, a few Soviet nu-
clear-powered missile submarines could be op-
erational this year.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 101 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.