Documents / FOIA release
This is National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-61, Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 25 April 1961. The estimate assesses Soviet surface-to-air, antimissile, air-to-air, air-to-surface, ballistic, ICBM, naval and space programs. It concludes that the first Soviet ICBM unit was probably operational around 1 January 1960. It also says there is no evidence the Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. It contains no UFO material.
“Pacific Ocean”1 page
C00278407 30 struct ion of launch sites in northwestern USSR in 1957-1959 are sufficient to support an estimate that as of about 1 January 1960, the first operational Soviet ICBM unit was trained and equipped with a few missiles and launchers. This is referred to as IOC date. We believe that since that time, the USSR has had at least some capability to launch ICBMs with good accuracy and reliability against targets in the US.IG IG 130. Beyond this point, however, any estimate of Soviet operational ICBM strength is e ri ti- ca ly dependent upon interpretation of ele- ments in the evidence which permit differing judgments. The question of the probable magnitude of current and future Soviet op- erational ICBM strength will be examined in the forthcoming NIE 11-8-61, "Soviet Capa- bilities for Long Range Attack." Follow-on ICBM Development 131. As we have indicated, the current ICBM is already reasonably accurate and reliable, rugged, and capable of delivering high-yield 'The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, De- partment of the Army, believes that by early 1960, the Soviets had developed a 5,000 n.m. missile satis- factory for emergency deployment to interim ICBM launch facilities and that a few missiles possibly were deployed to such facilities. He believes that an IOC with fully developed, deployed, operational missile launch facilities did not occur in 1960. "The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intel- ligence), Department of the Navy, believes the So- viets probably had an emergency capability to launch a few missiles from test facilities (as opposed to operational launch sites) starting early in 1960. Factors which bear against a deployed operational ICBM capability and which are mentioned in the estimate weigh heavil y in his judgment. These in- clude4 the lack of ICBM troop training activity, and the lac of firm, evidence on operational ICBM sites. In addition, the first appearance of what appears to be an operational type site at Area C at Tyuratam which was estimated to be completed in late 1960 or early 1961 leads him to judge that operational launch sites were not available before that time. warheads against targets anywhere in the US. It will probably continue to be modified and its performance characteristics Unproved over the next few years. Decoys and nosecones with reduced radar reflectivity may be developed for it. Somewhat greater flexibility will prob- ably be achieved in the deployment concept, and much effort will be directed towards per- fecting the logistic support, maintenance, and communications facilities necessary to the most effective employment of an ICBM force. But the present ICBM is extremely bulky and must be fairly (i nf.:i l lt cri handle, it has the relatively slow reaction time of a very large nonstorable liquid-fueled system with the at- tendant problem of holding the missile for periods of time, and it does not readily lend itself to deployment in hardened sites. 132. It is probable, therefore, that the Soviets would find it desirable to develop a new ICBM system which would incorporate some of the improvements mentioned above and would overcome disadvantages inherent in the pres- ent system. For example, while we do not exclude the possibility that the present sys- tem could be adapted to use missiles with storable liquid propellants, the better course for the USSR would almost certainly be to develop a new system using either storable liquid or solid fuels, and to ' build into it other elements compatible with such fuels. Greater flexibility and less vulnerability in deployment would be desirable characteristics for a follow- on ICBM system, even though rail service will probably continue to be an essential element in the preferred Soviet deployment concept. 133. A follow-on ICBM system may already be under development without our knowledge. We would expect. detectable flight tests to begin some 18 months to two years prior to first operational availability. Such tests could begin at any time, and we therefore believe that a follow-on ICBM system could become operational in about 1963 or after.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 101 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.