/specialCollection/MissileGap/1961/1961-04-25.pdf

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tailed measurements on accuracy and re-
entry effects. The intensive second period of
test firings was climaxed by the probable proof
testing of heavy nosecone missiles to 4,700 n.m.
into the Pacific. In light of these test suc-
cesses, the time elapsed since the beginning
of the firing program, the wealth of Soviet
experience with shorter range missiles, and
the additional data on booster performance
provided by the space program, we believe
that the Soviets were in a position to consider
their 5,000 n.m. ICBM satisfactory for initial
dcpioyment by the end of 1959. With the ad-
ditional results from the third period of the
firing program, they were probably in a simi-
lar position with respect to their lighter nose-
cone, 7,000 n.m. missile by about mid-1960.
125.The establishment of an operational ca-
pability, however, ‘fequires not only a certain
confidence in the weapon system—it also re-
quires that missiles, trained personnel, and
launching and ground support facilities be
available for operational use. The last of
these would require the longest lead time—
probably 18 months to two years for initial
sites.
126.Concerning the availability of missiles,
we believe that in early 1959, the USSR began
the manufacture of production ICBMs—that
is, complete missiles of an operational type,
which, however, could also be modified for use
as space boosters. ICBMs produced prior to
that time are believed to have been prototypes,
manufactured at a scientific research institute
near Moscow, whereas other SoviAt industrial
plants have apparently been involved in the
manufacture of production missiles. We base
these judgments on Soviet progress in missile
development, on information about plant ac-
tivities, and 'especially on the increased avail-
ability of missiles indicated by the doubling
of the rate of ICBM and space launchings in
1959. These evidences lend credence to as-
sertions by Khrushchev and other Soviet lead-
ers that "series production" of ICBMs began
early that year. We still do not know the ac-
tual rate of production. However, normal
Soviet practice in other military and indus-
trial programs points to the probable avail-
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ability by late 1959 of at least some ICBMs
above and beyond the numbers expended in
firings.
127.As for operating personnel, we have not
yet identified any ICBM-related training ac-
tivity
jpossible that
some such training was accomplished in con-
junction with test firings. In any case, muth
of the necessary training would be done with-
out firing at all. Normal Soviet practice with
other missile system's, however seems to call
for fairly extensive training
usually at
special facilities constructed a the range-
head. These facilities support the training
activity and are also used to check out the
operational handling and launching equip-
ment. The newly-constructed launch area
"C" at Tyuratam can be interpreted as such
a facility. It probably also represents the
approximate configuration of an operational
launching facility.
128.We are still unable to identify positively
any ICBM launching facilities other than
those at the test range. Nevertheless, there
are a number of locations on which we have
evidence pointing to the existence of launch-
ing facilities, either completed or under con-
struction. There are at least three suspect
rail-served locations in northwestern USSR,
the area me.st suitable for deployment of a
5,000 n.m. missile. Construction activity at
these locations was apparently underway in
1957-1959, suggesting that some sites were
prepared concurrently with the development
of the missile. Fragmentary information on
possible construction of ICBM sites in other
areas, while very limited, is consistent in tim-
ing with the development of a 7,000 n.m.
missile.
129. On balance, we consider that the devel-
opment by the end of 1959 of a 5,000 n.m.
ICBM satisfactory for initial deployment, the
probable manufacture of production missiles
beginning early in 1959, and the possible con-