Documents / FOIA release
This is National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-61, Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 25 April 1961. The estimate assesses Soviet surface-to-air, antimissile, air-to-air, air-to-surface, ballistic, ICBM, naval and space programs. It concludes that the first Soviet ICBM unit was probably operational around 1 January 1960. It also says there is no evidence the Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. It contains no UFO material.
“The Advance”10 pages
C00278407 ,TOP SECRET SOVIET TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES IN GUIDED MISSILES AND SPACE VEHICLES THE PROBLEM To estimate Soviet capabilities and probable programs for the development of guided missiles, and the major performance characteristics and dates of operational availability of such missiles. In addition, to estimate the objectives and technical capabilities of the Soviets in space. (The period covered runs through about 1966, except where otherwise stated.) SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 1. Soviet capabilities in guided missiles and space vehicles rest upon a major na- tional effort in research and development pursued over the past 15 years. The USSR now has two major missile test ranges at Kapustin Yar/Vladimirovka and Tyuratam, an extremely large com- plex at Sary Shagan for the development of defenses against ballistic missiles, and other lesser test facilities (see Figure 1). The ICBM and space programs have shared facilities on the Tyuratam range. All of these facilities have been signifi- cantly expanded within the past two or three years. 2. The Soviets have concentrated on the development of only a few systems at any one time. With the possible exception of the first surface-to-air system, deployed around Moscow, there has been no indi- cation that Soviet guided missiles were developed on a "crash" basis. The So- viets now have operationally available_ _ about 20 individual missile systems for surface, air, and sea employment. To date, they appear to have concentrated on initial satisfaction of a broad range of military requirements, and to have given little attention to second generation missile systems. Future Soviet efforts probably will place greater emphasis on " development of such systems as well as the improvement of existing systems. 3. We have good evidence on the develop- ment of most of the current Soviet missile systems; our estimates of the remaining systems are largely inferred from Soviet requirements and technical capabilities. Our ability to collect and interpret in- formation on test firings of Soviet ballistic missiles and space vehicles has been rela- tively good. We are reasonably confident TOP SECRET
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 101 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.