/specialCollection/MissileGap/1961/1961-04-25.pdf

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obvious way of achieving a given level of as-
surance of neutralizing a specific number of
targets is simply to salvo the total number of
missiles theoretically required. This might
involve firing more than one missile against
each target. With retargeting, however, the
same theoretical assurance could be achieved
with fewer missiles by sa/voing, say, only one
missile against each target, determining
whether or not that missile proved unreliable
on launcher or during the powered phase of
its flight, and directing additional missiles
against only those targets left uncovered be-
cause of failures. This would require the
availability of standby missiles on launchers,
which had been counted down and into which
alternate trajectory data could be inserted as
needed. Standby missiles not used in retar-
geting could be employed against additional
targets or could be held in reserve.
120.There is no evidence that the Soviets have
actually built a retargeting capability into
their ICBM system, but we would not expect
to have evidence of this type. In light of its
potential advantages, we regard it as possible
that the Soviets have developed a capability
for retargeting. Provided that standby mis-
siles were ready on their own launchers and
counted down along with those of the first
salvo, the Soviets could probably detect fail-
ures, retarget, and launch additional missiles
with delays of no more than 10 to 20 minutes.
121.A refinement of the retargeting tech-
nique, called reprograming, could be em-
ployed in an attack designed to strike targets
or warning lines as nearly simultaneously as
possible. This technique involves the launch-
ing of first salvo missiles on extremely high
trajectories so as to lengthen their time of
flight; standby missiles can then be launched
on lower tralectories which will tend to com-
pensate for the delays incurred by retargeting.
This would require major modifications to the
ICBM system, and testing of a type we could
expect to detect. No such testing has oc-
curred. We believe that the Soviets do not
now possess a reprograming capability, but
with a high priority effort the technique could
probably be developed and checked out by
about 1963.
122.Even more highly refined retargeting
techniques are theoretically possible, such as
the determination of probable missile impact
points while the missiles are en route to the
target. On the basis of such a determination,
the degradation in system effectiveness caused
by guidance errors could be reduced. Because
of their considerable cost and the complica-
tions they would introduce, the Soviets are not
likely to employ such techniques.
123. Techniques to Evade BMEWS. Although
we have no evidence of Soviet interest in de-
veloping a capability to evade BMEWS, the
Soviets theoretically could, if they desired,
evolve measures for countering BMEWS even
when this early warning system is fully in-
stalled in 1963. It is probable that with a few
tests they could prove out a capability to fire
their current ICBMs on somewhat lowered tra-
jectories at certain selected targets, taking ad-
vantage of a few gaps in the planned BMEWS
coverage. With substantial modifications, the
current Soviet system could acquire a capa-
bility to reduce the chances of BMEWS de-
tection by using extremely low or extremely
high trajectories, but CEP would probably be
degraded to 5-10 n.m. With more substan-
tial modifications, the present system could - -
probably deliver a 3,000 pound warhead to a
range of about 16,000 n.m., a distance suffi-
cient to permit southern trajectories from the
USSR to the US, but CEP would probably be
degraded to at least 10 n.m. The modifications
envisaged above would require considerable
testing which would probably be detected.
While the USSR could probably develop these
techniques by about 1963, their operational
advantages seem so marginal that we regard
them as unlikely.
Milestones in the Program
124.The evidence derived from flight testing
is adequate to gauge the general progress of
Soviet efforts to prove out the configuration,
propulsion, guidance, and nosecone of their
ICBM system. In the first two periods of the
test-firing program, through 1959, the Soviets
launched a total of 20 generally successful
ICBMs, most of them to the land impact area
on Kamchatka where they could make de-
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