Documents / FOIA release
This is National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-61, Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 25 April 1961. The estimate assesses Soviet surface-to-air, antimissile, air-to-air, air-to-surface, ballistic, ICBM, naval and space programs. It concludes that the first Soviet ICBM unit was probably operational around 1 January 1960. It also says there is no evidence the Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. It contains no UFO material.
“The Advance”10 pages
CO0278407 27 113.The CEP of the Soviet ICBM system will probably continue to improve, at a rate de- pendent in part on technical factors and in part on the priority the USSR attaches to it. With a very high priority assigned to accuracy, and therefore to the necessary troop training and introduction of more refined components, the operational CEP of portions of the force might reach one n.m. possibly as early as 1963, but we regard 1965 as a more likely date for such an achievement. However, major por- tions of a Soviet ICBM force would not neces- sarily be trained . or retrofitted for highly re fined accuracy. The Soviets probably would regard the present level of accuracy as suffi- cient for many types of potential targets. 114.There is no evidence of the development of all-inertial guidance for use in large Soviet ballistic missiles. However, the \ greater flexi- bility which could be achieved with this type of guidance may induce the Soviets to intro- duce it into their ICBM system, despite the probability that its accuracy would be some- what inferior to that of radio-inertial guid- ance. If so, all-inertial guidance could be introduced for operational use in 1963 or after. 115.Reliability. We estimate that as of mid- 1961 some 70-85 percent of the USSR's ICBMs on launcher would be "ready missiles"—that is, both the missile and the launcher would be in commission and ready to be committed to a launch countdown. The lower limit of this range approximates the percentage which might be maintained ready in continuous peacetime operations for an indefinite period. The upper limit might be achieved if the So- viets prepared their force for an attack at a specific time designated well in advance, i.e., maximum readiness. The ready missile rate is expected to improve for a year or so and then level off. v.Ranges comparable to those given above might approximate 85-90 percent in 1963. 116.With respect to reliability on launcher and in flight, we estimate that as of mid-1961, some 60-75 percent of the USSR's ready ICBMs could successfully go through count- down, leave their launchers at scheduled times or not later than 15-30 minutes thereafter, and detonate in the vicinity of a ssigned tar- gets—that is, within about three CEP's of their aiming points. As in the preceding para- graph, the upper limit would be more likely to be achievable if the Soviets had provided time for peaking their forces on launcher prior to an attack at a specific time. These per- centages might increase to 70-80 percent in 1963. 117.A general approximation of the total re- liability of a Soviet ICBM force can be made by combining the factors discussed above. On this basis, we estimate that if they were em- ployed in about mid-1961, some 40-65 percent of the total number of Soviet ICBMs . on launchers would detonate in the vicinity of as- signed targets within about 15-30 minutes of scheduled times. A comparable estimate for 1963 is 60-70 percent. In theory, half of those missiles detonating in the vicinity of their tar- gets would fall within the CEP. As indicated in paragraph 111 these estimates are based on imprecise data and involve assumptions of unknown validity regarding the conditions under which the force might be employed. 118.Reaction Times. The Soviet design phi- losophy, particularly with respect to the fuel- ing techniques employed at operational launch sites, will critically affect ICBM reaction times. Assuming that rapid reaction time has been a Soviet objective, we estimate the following minimum reaction time for ready missiles under the three alert conditions indicated: Condition I: Crews on routine standby, electrical equipment cold, missiles not fueled. Reaction time: 1-3 hours. Condition II: Crews on alert, electrical equipment warmed up, missiles not fueled. Reaction time: 15-30 minutes. Condition III: Crews on alert, electrical equipment warmed up, missiles fueled and topped. This condition probably could not be maintained for more than an hour or so. Reaction time: 5-10 minutes. 119.Retargeting Techniques. It would be technically feasible for the USSR to have de- veloped retargeting techniques to minimize the degradation in the effectiveness of an ICBM force caused by reliability factors. The
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 101 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.