Documents / FOIA release
This is National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-61, Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 25 April 1961. The estimate assesses Soviet surface-to-air, antimissile, air-to-air, air-to-surface, ballistic, ICBM, naval and space programs. It concludes that the first Soviet ICBM unit was probably operational around 1 January 1960. It also says there is no evidence the Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. It contains no UFO material.
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000278407 26 takeoff but four of the five engines, and per- haps fuel tanks as well, are jettisoned at alti- tude. The vehicle itself is probably of heavy, airframe-type, welded aluminum construction. 108. Nosecone and Payload. The Soviets have developed and tested ICBM nosecones of two different weight classes, one extremely heavy and the other somewhat lighter. Both are designed for high speed re-entry. The pay- load is protected from the heat of re-entry by a type of ablative material which is different from that used on any current US nosecone. The very heavy nosecones, varying in weight from 13,000 to 15,000 pounds and capable of carrying maximum payloads of 6,000 to 10,000 pounds, were used on ICBMs launched from Tyuratam in the first two phases of the firing program. This class of nosecone was tested extensively in firings to Kamchatka in 1959, and was probably proof tested to 4,700 n.m. Into the Pacific in October of that year. Most of the firings in the 1960 phase of the pro- gram used a lighter nosecone weighing ap- proximately 8,000-9,000 pounds, capable of carrying about 6,000 pounds of payload. This nosecone was proof tested to 6,700 n.m. into the Pacific in July 1960. 109.It is probable that the initial development of a very heavy nosecone was made necessary by the great weight required for high-yield nuclear warheads when the Soviet ICBM was first on the drawing boards, and by the Soviet state of the art in re-entry techniques at that time. Subsequent advances in Soviet nuclear technology probably provided a high-yield war- head suitable for use in a lighter weight nose- cone." 110. Range. Nosecone weight is critical to the range of the Soviet ICBM. Given the basic similarity of the boosters used in all Tyuratam launchings, Soviet ICBM with a very heavy nosecone would have a nominal maximum range of about 5,000 n.m. This range is sub- ject to variations of some hundreds of miles depending on missile trajectory, the latitudes of launching sites and targets, and direction " For a discussion of warhead yields, see Annex E, "Estimated Present Nuclear Warhead Capabilities." (Limited Distribution) of fire in relation to the earth's rotation. So- viet ICBMs with heavy nosecones could achieve extensive coverage of US territory only if they were deployed in northwestern USSR or in the Soviet Far East. An ICBM with lighter nosecone, however, would have a nomi- nal maximum range of about 7,000 n.m., sub- ject to the same variations. Soviet ICBMs of this type could achieve full coverage of the US from deployment areas virtually anywhere in the USSR, including Tyuratam itself. Performance Under Operatic:Inc-A Candit:ons 111. The data available for estimating Soviet ICBM accuracy and reliability under opera- tional conditions are far from adequate or ex- act. We have taken into account the growing body of evidence on Soviet test range results and on Soviet state-of-the-art in critical sys- tem components, at the same time attempting to minimize the use of analogies to US mis- siles. But even if we had exact data from the test range and had examined the Soviet com- ponents, the estimate of system performance under actual wartime conditions would still re- quire assumptions as to the capabilities of the troops, the readiness of the units at the time of firing, and the precise circumstances of em- ployment, none of which can be known with certainty in advance. 112. Accuracy. The Soviet ICBM guidance system uses radio and inertial elements, in a manner which differs in some respects from US techniques. Inertial components within the missile control most of the powered phase of the missile's flight, with corrections made by ground-based radio command only in the last seconds before burnout. The data avail- able to us are not sufficient to permit more than an approximate determination of the CEP of the Soviet ICBM system. We estimate that with the present type of guidance, Soviet ICBMs would have a CEP of about two n.m. under operational conditions in mid-1961, but the actual figure could be considerably greater or somewhat less. The figure given is in- tended as an approximation for an entire ICBM force, with crews of various levels of competence firing against targets at various ranges. TOP SI;CIZET
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 101 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.