Documents / FOIA release
This is National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-61, Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 25 April 1961. The estimate assesses Soviet surface-to-air, antimissile, air-to-air, air-to-surface, ballistic, ICBM, naval and space programs. It concludes that the first Soviet ICBM unit was probably operational around 1 January 1960. It also says there is no evidence the Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. It contains no UFO material.
“Low Earth orbit”3 pages
C00278407 25 Tyuratam to Klyuchi. Since that time, we have acquired a large volume of evidence per- taining to the test range launching of ICBMs and of the space vehicles which have been interspersed with them.' 2 Intelligence on this activity is acquired by a variety of technical collection means, including radar, acoustic detection, and electronic interception of mis- sile telemetry. We are confident that virtu- ally all successful launchings from Tyuratam have been detected, and some information is available on failures as well. We have very little evidence, hc..•.•ever, ch the develeprnent of components or on static testing associated with this program. 103. Since the beginning of the firing pro- gram, a total of about 60 ICBMs and space vehicles have been launched from Tyuratam, al i of which are believed to have used basic rocket boosters of essentially the same con- figuration. The rate of booster utilization in actual firings was about 10 in 1958 and then increased to roughly 20 per year in 1959 and 1960. About 10 have already been Utilized in the first three months of 1961. 104. Of these launchings, about 35 have been generally successful ICBMs which reached the vicinity of intended impact areas on Kam- chatka or in the Pacific. To date, the infiight reliability of Soviet ICBMs on the test range has been about 70-75 percent; the reliability achieved in space shots has been considerably lower, probably because of the addition of upper stages and other complicating elements. Firings in the ICBM test program fall into four time periods: a. A few initial firings of about 3,500 n.m. to Kamchatka between mid-1957 and mid- 1958, followed by a lull of nearly six months. b. A period of increasingly frequent firings in 1959, most of them to Kamchatka but with two shots to instrumented ships in the Pacific, about 4,700 n.m. from the rangehead, in Oc- tober 1959. c. A period of less frequent firings in the first half of 1960, including four to instru- "For a detailed account of ICBM test activity at Tyuratam, see Annex F. "Soviet Missile Test Range Activities." (Limited Distribution) mented ships at a range of about 6,700 n.m. in January and July, followed by another lull of nearly six months. d. A resumption of frequent firings to Kam- chatka in early 1961. 105. The total number of ICBM launchings over this 354 year period is small by compari- son with Soviet aactice in medium and short range missiles. L Many of the Soviet space shots have occurr during the lulls in ICBM firings, and it is apparent that the ICBM and space programs have shared available boost- ers, test range facilities, and experience which has been mutually supporting. In light of these factors, we conclude that the USSR has been conducting a generally successful but careful ICBM development program, at a de- liberate pace rather than on . a "crash" basis. Physicai Characteristics 106.From the extensive data which have been acquired, US intelligence has reasonable con, fidence in its general description of the Soviet ICBM system, despite the fact that no quali- fied Western observer has ever seen a Soviet ICBM. Most of our evidence is from the moni- toring of test firings and photography of range installations, but we have acquired valuable supporting information from man y other sources, irc illai ng, for example,C ja Soviet lunar probe. In gen- eral, we rind that the Soviet ICBM system dif- fers in important respects to US missiles. 107. Configuration. The Soviet ICBM and space booster is a very large vehicle, with a gross takeoff weight of some 450,000-500,000 pounds and a total thrust at takeoff of about 750,000 pounds. This thrust is attained through the use of five main rocket engines which burn nonstorable liquid propellants. The ICBM is either 1 Y2 staged or parallel staged—that is, all engines are ignited at
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 101 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.