Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/MissileGap/1961/1961-04-25.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 101 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-61, Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 25 April 1961. The estimate assesses Soviet surface-to-air, antimissile, air-to-air, air-to-surface, ballistic, ICBM, naval and space programs. It concludes that the first Soviet ICBM unit was probably operational around 1 January 1960. It also says there is no evidence the Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. It contains no UFO material.

  • p. 42 …14 fool Roder • i 'Gray 163 X/ 41Mh 110 Foos Dome WOG/.... ..._, ' 0 sm.4...,.....r…
C00278407
25
Tyuratam to Klyuchi. Since that time, we
have acquired a large volume of evidence per-
taining to the test range launching of ICBMs
and of the space vehicles which have been
interspersed with them.' 2 Intelligence on this
activity is acquired by a variety of technical
collection means, including radar, acoustic
detection, and electronic interception of mis-
sile telemetry. We are confident that virtu-
ally all successful launchings from Tyuratam
have been detected, and some information is
available on failures as well. We have very
little evidence, hc..•.•ever, ch the develeprnent
of components or on static testing associated
with this program.
103. Since the beginning of the firing pro-
gram, a total of about 60 ICBMs and space
vehicles have been launched from Tyuratam,
al i of which are believed to have used basic
rocket boosters of essentially the same con-
figuration. The rate of booster utilization in
actual firings was about 10 in 1958 and then
increased to roughly 20 per year in 1959 and
1960. About 10 have already been Utilized
in the first three months of 1961.
104. Of these launchings, about 35 have been
generally successful ICBMs which reached the
vicinity of intended impact areas on Kam-
chatka or in the Pacific. To date, the infiight
reliability of Soviet ICBMs on the test range
has been about 70-75 percent; the reliability
achieved in space shots has been considerably
lower, probably because of the addition of
upper stages and other complicating elements.
Firings in the ICBM test program fall into
four time periods:
a. A few initial firings of about 3,500 n.m.
to Kamchatka between mid-1957 and mid-
1958, followed by a lull of nearly six months.
b. A period of increasingly frequent firings
in 1959, most of them to Kamchatka but with
two shots to instrumented ships in the Pacific,
about 4,700 n.m. from the rangehead, in Oc-
tober 1959.
c. A period of less frequent firings in the
first half of 1960, including four to instru-
"For a detailed account of ICBM test activity at
Tyuratam, see Annex F. "Soviet Missile Test Range
Activities." (Limited Distribution)
mented ships at a range of about 6,700 n.m.
in January and July, followed by another lull
of nearly six months.
d. A resumption of frequent firings to Kam-
chatka in early 1961.
105. The total number of ICBM launchings
over this 354 year period is small by compari-
son with Soviet aactice in medium and short
range missiles. L
Many of the Soviet space
shots have occurr during the lulls in ICBM
firings, and it is apparent that the ICBM and
space programs have shared available boost-
ers, test range facilities, and experience which
has been mutually supporting. In light of
these factors, we conclude that the USSR has
been conducting a generally successful but
careful ICBM development program, at a de-
liberate pace rather than on . a "crash" basis.
Physicai Characteristics
106.From the extensive data which have been
acquired, US intelligence has reasonable con,
fidence in its general description of the Soviet
ICBM system, despite the fact that no quali-
fied Western observer has ever seen a Soviet
ICBM. Most of our evidence is from the moni-
toring of test firings and photography of range
installations, but we have acquired valuable
supporting information from man y other
sources, irc illai ng, for example,C
ja Soviet lunar probe. In gen-
eral, we rind that the Soviet ICBM system dif-
fers in important respects to US missiles.
107. Configuration. The Soviet ICBM and
space booster is a very large vehicle, with a
gross takeoff weight of some 450,000-500,000
pounds and a total thrust at takeoff of about
750,000 pounds. This thrust is attained
through the use of five main rocket engines
which burn nonstorable liquid propellants.
The ICBM is either 1 Y2 staged or parallel
staged—that is, all engines are ignited at

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 101 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.