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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1961/1961-04-25.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 101 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-61, Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 25 April 1961. The estimate assesses Soviet surface-to-air, antimissile, air-to-air, air-to-surface, ballistic, ICBM, naval and space programs. It concludes that the first Soviet ICBM unit was probably operational around 1 January 1960. It also says there is no evidence the Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. It contains no UFO material.

  • p. 15 …At the test range, the Soviets have fol- lowed a generally similar pattern in the de…
  • p. 33 …We believe that at the present time, the Soviets are well advanced in a program to…
  • p. 57 …the Soviet state of the art in re-entry techniques at that time. Subsequent advances in…
  • p. 58 …specific time designated well in advance, i.e., maximum readiness. The ready missile rate is expected…
  • p. 66 …program for developing advanced ASW weap- ons systems exists. The USSR has the basic scientific and…
  • p. 80 …technological advances in sev- eral key areas. 163.The Soviets are aware of the advantages offered…
  • p. 81 …The caliber of the Soviet work to date indicates that the USSR is among world leaders…
  • p. 82 …the vehicle should permit the Soviets to effect rendezvous with an earth orbiting vehicle. 173.Advanced…
  • p. 91 …We estimate the SS-6, and probably the SS-5, will probably utilize fixed sites. The…
  • p. 93 …The Academy of Sciences provides supplementary proposals and re- search programs designed to advance the state…
19TOP SECRET
C00278407
76. Because of its concurrent development
with AS-2 and its greater range, we believe
that the AS-3 was designed primarily for use
against land targets. With all-inertial guid-
ahce, its CEP against such targets would prob-
ably be about 1-2 n.m. If used against ships,
the AS-3 probably would have to employ in
addition a radar terminal homing guidance
system which would give a CEP of about 150
feet. In this case, however, either its range
would have to be reduced or other aircraft or
ships would be required to aid in detection,
=1:7n,ui3in. and identification of the target.
and possibly in guiding the missile.
77. The AS-3 probably was designed for use
with the BEAR and BISON heavy bombers.
We estimate that the AS-3 weighs about 9,000-
10,000 pounds. The BEAR or BISON .could
carry two on an ‘operational mission. We cal-
culate a range degradation of about 8-10 per-
cent for these aircraft when carrying one such
missile, and 15-20 percent when carrying two.
It is possible that the BADGER could carry
this missile, but we believe it unlikely that
the BADGER would be employed in this role.
78.The Soviets are also capable of developing
air-to-surface missiles designed to home on
radar transmitters and air-launched decoys
to simulate medium or heavy bombers. These
systems could now be operational, but there
is no evidence of their development.
Future Developments
79. We believe that the USSR has a require-
ment for and may develop during the period
of this estimate an air-launched missile with
a maximum range of 500-1,000 n.m. and a
higher survival potential than the AS-3. Ei-
ther a ballistic or a cruise type missile might
be developed to meet this need, and we are
unable to estimate its characteristics at this
time.

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 101 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.