Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/MissileGap/1961/1961-04-25.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 101 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-61, Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 25 April 1961. The estimate assesses Soviet surface-to-air, antimissile, air-to-air, air-to-surface, ballistic, ICBM, naval and space programs. It concludes that the first Soviet ICBM unit was probably operational around 1 January 1960. It also says there is no evidence the Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. It contains no UFO material.

  • p. 15 …At the test range, the Soviets have fol- lowed a generally similar pattern in the de…
  • p. 33 …We believe that at the present time, the Soviets are well advanced in a program to…
  • p. 57 …the Soviet state of the art in re-entry techniques at that time. Subsequent advances in…
  • p. 58 …specific time designated well in advance, i.e., maximum readiness. The ready missile rate is expected…
  • p. 66 …program for developing advanced ASW weap- ons systems exists. The USSR has the basic scientific and…
  • p. 80 …technological advances in sev- eral key areas. 163.The Soviets are aware of the advantages offered…
  • p. 81 …The caliber of the Soviet work to date indicates that the USSR is among world leaders…
  • p. 82 …the vehicle should permit the Soviets to effect rendezvous with an earth orbiting vehicle. 173.Advanced…
  • p. 91 …We estimate the SS-6, and probably the SS-5, will probably utilize fixed sites. The…
  • p. 93 …The Academy of Sciences provides supplementary proposals and re- search programs designed to advance the state…
16
tern, the USSR could achieve a limited capa-
bility to destroy such vehicles after they have
made a number of orbits. This could prob-
ably be accomplished from the Sary Shagan
area in about 1963, against satellites with rela-
tively low orbits. With an extensive effort,
it might be accomplished sooner with a nu-
clear-armed 700 or 1,100 n.m. missile launched
on collision course from a test range if the
orbital parameters were established. The pub-
lished information on US programs probably
will provide incentive for Soviet development
of antisatellite capabilities. However, we do
not believe that the USSR will have a system
for destruction of satellites on their first orbit
until the latter part of the decade.

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 101 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.