Documents / FOIA release
This is National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-61, Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 25 April 1961. The estimate assesses Soviet surface-to-air, antimissile, air-to-air, air-to-surface, ballistic, ICBM, naval and space programs. It concludes that the first Soviet ICBM unit was probably operational around 1 January 1960. It also says there is no evidence the Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. It contains no UFO material.
“The Advance”10 pages
TO-P SECRET- 15 nents. Antimissile missile tests and integrated systems tests may have occurred in late 1960 or early 1961. Such tests at that time would lend support to the multiple installation hy- pothesis. In the single installation hypothe- sis, integrated system tests could not be con- ducted until the period mid-1962 to mid-1963. 59. The timing of the first Soviet deployment of an antiballistic missile system will be de- termined mostly by the current status of the testing program, its future progress, and de- gree of success. However, this timing could probably be u.cceleratcd by an early Covet decision that the system then being tested would prove to be satisfactory for operational use. Such a decision must be reached a few years before an operational capability is achieved. If the Soviets are confident that their present approach will in fact result in a workable antimissile system, and if they attach great urgency to early deployment, they can accelerate this deployment by starting construction and the production of com- ponents before they resolve all the technical problems, as they did in the case of the SA-1 antiaircraft system. Among the most serious of these problems is that of achieving the flexi- bility and discrimination to cope with the numerous, widely dispersed ballistic missiles of various types and ranges which the West will possess within a few years, including types with sophisticated nosecones and penetration aids. 60. We have no basis for a firm estimate for the date of the first operational deployment of a Soviet antiballistic missile system, or of its effectiveness against the various types of West- ern ballistic missiles. Judging by the activ- ities at Sary Shagan and Uka, we believe that a system designed for use against both ICBMs and IRBMs could first be deployed in the period 196371966. The earliest of these dates is contingertt upon a Soviet decision to as- sume the high risks of starting production and deployment prior to full system tests, and therefore is considered the earliest possible date. If deployed early in the period, the capability of the system against IR1314fs prob- ably would be the more thoroughly tested. It should be noted that continuing success in research and development will be necessary if the USSR is to achieve any operational anti- ballistic missile capabilities in 1963-1966. It is unlikely that systems which could be de- ployed during this time period would have discrimination capabilities against sophisti- cated decoys. 61. We believe that the Soviets would wish to deploy antimissile defenses for the protec- tion of at least a few critical areas, even if the available system provided only an interim, limited capability. Such a course would be cunsistent with the high priority they have accorded to improving their defenses against Western nuclear strikes. Moreover, the early deployment of an antimissile system, even if its effectiveness were limited or uncertain, would almost certainly be regarded by the So- viets as having great political impact and as weighing significantly in the world balance of forces. We therefore estimate that the USSR will probably begin at least limited deployment of an antiballistic missile system in about 1963-19t56. 62. Soviet research and development in anti- missile defense, perhaps including unconven- tional techniques, will undoubtedly continue as long as there are ballistic missiles. The _ Soviets almost certainly will design their first system in such a way that improved compo- nents can be incorporated as they become available. Improvements might include in- troduction of a better intercept vehicle or bet- ter discrimination techniques. A discrimina- tion capability against targets outside the atmosphere probably could not be achieved until sorrietime after 1966. Antisatellite System 63. For some time to come, the Soviets are likely to have only a marginal capability under most favorable conditions for interference with US satellites. Even detection and track- ,ing in the early orbits of any satellite will be difficult, especially so if the satellite is dark, unannounced, or camouflaged. It will also be difficult for the Soviets to identify the func- tion of such a satellite. In the course of its program to develop an antimissile missile sys- T-
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 101 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.