Documents / FOIA release
This is National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-61, Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 25 April 1961. The estimate assesses Soviet surface-to-air, antimissile, air-to-air, air-to-surface, ballistic, ICBM, naval and space programs. It concludes that the first Soviet ICBM unit was probably operational around 1 January 1960. It also says there is no evidence the Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. It contains no UFO material.
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E 14 they lack basic effects data on high altitude and space detonations. However, we do not believe that the lack of such data would pre- vent Soviet deployment of a suitable nuclear warhead for an antimissile missile. Major Electronic Components 55. The electronic components of a terminal intercept system must be capable of the fol- lowing: detecting a target; acquiring it; dis- tinguishing or "discriminating" a missile nosecone from tankage and decoys; and track- ing the nczecone as well as guidi n g and track- ing the antimissile missile. It is not clear which of several possible approaches to this complicated problem the Soviets have selected. The precise role of each of the large radar installations at Sary Shagan has not been determined. Nor, because of the other missile and space activities conducted at and near Sary Shagan, is it certain that all of these are involved in antimissile work. From the of t.h ,r„ t.\,.) broad hypotheses have emerged, one pointing to a concept employing several electronics installations, the other to a single-installa- tion concept. 56. Under the multiple-installation concept, the major radar installations at Sary Shagan would be employed in combination to perform the electronic functions of an antimissile sys- tem. As an alternative hypothesis, it is pos- sible that the Soviets are seeking to accom- plish all the radar functions of an antimissile system with a single installation as they did in the case of the SA-1 and SA-2 antiaircraft systems. In the first hypothesis, acquisition and tracking could be accomplished by equip- ment with electronic components essentially complete for beginning of electronic test checkout in 1960. In the second hypothesis, the radarvin the 900-foot building is the critical component and an important factor in deter- mining the status of the program. Photog- raphy of April 1960 revealed that although,. the building shell itself appeared to be com- pleted, the installation as a whole was still under construction. Testing will probably be- gin this year, and about two years probably will be required to complete tests of such a complex installation. 57. Admittedly, these two hypotheses do not cover the entire range of possibilities. Indeed, the widespread and diverse Soviet activities which we have observed may r epresent de- velopmental programs on more than one type of antimissile system, and it is logical to sup- pose that the Soviets have done at least pre- liminary work designed to cope with the various ranges of Western ballistic missiles confronting them. Some of the installations and activities at Sary Shagan have been con- nected with work on a system designed for defense against short range ballistic missiles. But the fixed nature of the installations and the general progression of the activities to- wards work with longer range missiles leads US to believe that the primary R and D effort has been directed against IRBMs and ICBMs.' Milesknes in the Program 58. We believe that at the present time, the Soviets are well advanced in a program to Lasic data, conduct technical investi- gations, and test antimissile system compo- ' The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, De- partment of the Army, believes that the available evidence permits more detailed understanding and estimates of the antimissile systems under develop= ment at Sary Shagan and Ulca than Is reflected in this analysis. Based on this evidence he believes that there are three different, but Interrelated de- velopment efforts: a. Defenses against short and medium range bal- listic missiles (up to about 1,000 run.) which can be deployed by 1963. Evidence indicates that inte- grated systems tests began for one such system in late 1960. Development on these defenses is believed to be supported by one AMM launch complex at Sary Shagan and two subordinate target missile launch areas—one for 350 n.m. mkntles and one for 700 n.m. missiles. The AMM launch complex contains two modified SA-2 sites, which indicates the use of mo- bile systems in defenses against short range ballistic missiles. b. Multiple-installation, fixed-position defenses against IRBMs and ICBMs which can be deployed during the period 1963-1965. Based on target mis- sile firing rates and other evidence, systematic test- ing of components for this system probably began In March 1959. Proving of these components against the ICBM probably began at Ulca. in January 1961. c. Advanced investigations to improve AMM sys- tem equipment against all types of missile and space threats. The single installation concept is con- sidered to be only one of these advanced inveitiga- tlons. - -OP SECflE-P-
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 101 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.