Documents / FOIA release
This is National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-61, Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 25 April 1961. The estimate assesses Soviet surface-to-air, antimissile, air-to-air, air-to-surface, ballistic, ICBM, naval and space programs. It concludes that the first Soviet ICBM unit was probably operational around 1 January 1960. It also says there is no evidence the Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. It contains no UFO material.
“Gray”1 page
:00278407 • 13 II. SOVIET ANTIMISSILE PROGRAM 49. There is firm evidence that the Soviets are pursuing an extensive and high priority program for the development of defenses against ballistic missiles. Known Soviet in- terest and studies on this subject date from 1949, and an active research and development program appears to have been underway for several years. Photography of the Sary Shagan area in April 1960 revealed a large, elaborate facility which we believe to be en- gaged primarily in antimissile work (see Fig- ures 1 and 15). The Sary*Snagan area corn- 'prises one of the major Soviet guided mis- sile research development and test areas, second only in magnitude to the Kapustin Yar/Vladimirovka complex. Research and Development Activity 50. This very sizable activity covers some 8,000 square miles and contains housing accommo- cli rry: 'Dr nho ..,t- 20,000 peo7,IP. Pho',-)graphic interpretation indicates that there are more than 20 major electronics and communications Installations, including seven or more inter- ferometer sites, two 500-foot antennas, a 900- foot building containing an antenna, two 54.- foot diameter steerable dish antennas, and a 110-foot diameter radar dome (see Figures 16-19). These facilities are located near the 1,050 n.m. impact area of the Kapustin Yar ballistic missile test range. Close to the impact area are two complexes which contain probable launching sites: launch complex "A" includes two modified SA-2 sites; launch complex "B" contains a concrete pad 300 feet by 120 feet, which appears capable of launch- ing large vehicles, and two semicircular con- crete sites which may be launching pads of a new type (see Figure 20). Some of the facilities at Sary Shagan are three or four years old, and extensive construction work is still in progress. 51. The Soviets have installed some com- parable facilities in the Ulm area of the Kam- chatka Peninsula not far from the ICBM impact area near Klyuchi (see Figure 21). Construction at Uka has lagged behind that at Sary Shagan by a year or two and the installation is small by comparison. Our evidence indicates that it includes one 54-foot dish, one 110-foot dome, and one interfer- ometer. There are other instrumentation sites in the vicinity to monitor ICBM test shots to the area, and these may also contribute to antimissile research. 52.The Soviets have been collecting basic data useful for development of an antimissile sys- tem for several years. Since 1957, firings into the highly instrumented impact area at Sary Shagan have included about 100 ballistic mis- siles of 1,100 n.m. range, and probably a lesser. number of shorter range missiles. The im- pressive array of facilities at Sary Shagan ap- pears designed to investigate phenomena as- sociated with mid-course and terminal phases of the trajectories of these missiles. Collec- tion of similar data on the ICBM is presum- ably accomplished by. the facilities on Kam- chatka, but it is probable that considerably less data on the ICBM has been collected. 1elievc that this inveztig-ative effort is directed toward development of a terminal intercept system. The possible launching sites, drive-through building, facilities for han- dling explosives, and buildings which might be used for missile fabrication or assembly, all indicate that the antimissile system under development at Sary Shagan employs a mis- sile as the intercept vehicle. Considering So- viet state-of-the-art and the requirements im- posed by the nature of the system, we believe that the intercept vehicle will be a multiple- stage surface-launched missile probably using a solid propellant booster. Judging from past Soviet practice with surface-to-air missiles, we believe that command guidance will be em- ployed. 54. The missile probably will be equipped with a nuclear warhead? At present, such war- heads appear to offer the best promise for destruction of incoming ballistic missiles. Two of the nuclear devices tested by the USSR in 1958 might lend themselves to antimissile defense applications. We have no evidence of Soviet nuclear tests at very high altitudes (above 30,000 feet or in space) and believe that 'Annex E, "Estimated Present Nuclear Wartlead Capabilities." (Limited Distribution)
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 101 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.