Documents / FOIA release
This is National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-61, Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 25 April 1961. The estimate assesses Soviet surface-to-air, antimissile, air-to-air, air-to-surface, ballistic, ICBM, naval and space programs. It concludes that the first Soviet ICBM unit was probably operational around 1 January 1960. It also says there is no evidence the Soviets are developing offensive space weapons. It contains no UFO material.
“Kapustin Yar”16 pages
C:1 0 N) CO • We evaluate this program as "probable" with varying degrees of confidence, concerning detailed characteristics. Eac s missile listed will probably go through various stages of development which are not necessarily reflected in this table. The date when the first operational unit Is trained and equipped with a few missiles and launchers. • Generally a ballistic mistfle can be fired to ranges as short as approximately one-third the maximum operational ranv without. serious increase in CEP and to even shorter ranges with degraded accuracy. d CEP is the radius of a circle within which, statistically, one-half of the impacts will occur. Inherent, missile accuracies are somewhat better than the accu- racies specified in the table which take into consideration average degradation factors. The accuracies specified are upproximate figures which we apply to all ranges to which the missiles are likely to be fired. • The type of warhead employed with Soviet ballistic missiles will vary with the specific mission of the missile. In general, however, we believe that for missiles with maximum ranges of 350 natl. or less, high explosive (HE), nuclear, or chemical warfare, (CW) warheads will be employed in accordance with Soviet military doctrine, depending upon nuclear stockpiles, missile accuracy, character of the target, and results desired. We estimate that for missiles with ranges of 700 n.m. and over, only nuclear warheads will be employed, although we do not, exclude the possibility of CW.usc in 700 n.m. missiles for certain limited purposes. We believe that the USSR is capable of developing techniques for missile dissemination of biological warfare (BW) agents, although we have no specific evidence relating I3W and missile research and development. In view of operational considerations we consider 13W use in the ballistic missiles un- likely, although possible for certain special purposes. Should the Soviets so desire, ICBM accuracy could be improved to 1 n.m. as early as 1963, but we regard 1965 as a more likely date for such an achievement. • It is pointed out that the rotation of the earth, the latitudes of the launch point and target affect the maximum range of a ballistic missile, with the Influ- ence becoming significant at the longer ranges. For the SS-5 and SS—G maximum range indicated Is nominal, for a nonrotating earth aad in some cases, should be adjusted. b For the views of the Assistant Chief of Stair for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the .Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the-.Navy, see their footnotes, page 30.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 101 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.