Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 18 …Leghorn persuaded his superiors to submit his suggestion to the . Pentagon for funding. He had not…
  • p. 20 …Meanwhile Leghorn, frustrated by the rejection of his original concept, had transferred to the Pentagon in…
  • p. 22 …become the assistant director of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program, was in the Pentagon on business…
  • p. 24 …for the construction and maintenance of 30 aircraft to a group of senior Pentagon officials that…
  • p. 26 …He had been present at Kelly Johnson's presentation on the CL-282 at the Pentagon…
  • p. 27 …with Strong in the Pentagon on 12 May 1954. six days before the Wright Air Development…
  • p. 52 …Late on the morning of 2 December 1954, Dulles told Bissell to go to the Pentagon…
  • p. 91 …1-le then briefed a high-level Pentagon panel that included the Secretary of the Air…
  • p. 92 …After a half hour passed, the base commander called the Pentagon to ask where the crippled…
82
Arthur C. Lundahl
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
ARC gave the top priority target list to the Project Director, and
the project staff's operations section then used the list to plan the
flightpaths for U-2 missions. Although the requirements committee
was not responsible for developing flight plans, it assisted the plan-
ners with detailed target information as required. When a flight plan
was ready for submission to the President for approval, the committee
drew up a detailed justification for the selection of the targets. This
paper accompanied the flight plan.'"
In developing and prioritizing lists of targets, the committee
members had to take into account the varying needs and interests of
their parent organizations. Thus, the CIA representatives generally
emphasized strategic intelligence: aircraft and munitions factories,
power-generating complexes, nuclear establishments, roads, bridges,
inland waterways. In contrast, the military services usually placed a
heavier emphasis on order-of-battle data. The Air Force, in particular,
had a strong interest in gathering intelligence on the location of
Soviet and East European airfields and radars.
Although the committee members kept the interests of their ser-
vices or agencies in mind, their awareness of the vital nature of their
mission kept the level of cooperation high. The group always attempted
to reach a consensus before issuing its recommendations, although oc-
casionally this was not possible and one or more agencies would add a
dissent to the recommendation of the committee as a whole."'
PREPARATIONS TO HANDLE THE
PRODUCT OF U-2 MISSIONS
On 13 December 1954, DCI Allen Dulles and his assistant, Richard
Bissell, briefed Arthur C. Lundahl, the chief of CIA's Photo-
Intelligence Division (PID), on Project AQUATONE. At Da
Dulles's direction, Lundahl immediately set in motion within his divi-
sion a compartmented effort, known as Project EQUINE, to plan for
the exploitation of overhead photography from the U-2 project. With
only 13 members, the ND staff was too small to handle the expected
" Ibid.: James Q. Reber. interview by Donald E. Welzenbach and Gregory W. Pedlow,
Washington, DC, 21 May 1987 (S).
" Reber interview (S).
Shiet
UNCLASSIFIED

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.