Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 6 …Project OXCART, 1956-1968 The Evaluation of Designs for a Successor to the U-2 260…
  • p. 22 …retired from the Air Force to become the assistant director of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program…
  • p. 24 ORN Chapter 1 11 Kelly Johnson %.419r.,‹ 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED gravity (g's) instead of the military…
  • p. 27 …He later advanced to the rank of brigadier general in the reserve. For Strong's contacts…
  • p. 32 …lithium deuteride, a tech- nology more advanced than the heavy water method used by US BEACON…
  • p. 33 …between the developed and undeveloped nations. This aggressive Soviet foreign policy, combined with advances in nuclear…
  • p. 58 …secrecy in the new project, Kelly Johnson placed it in Lockheed's Advanced Development facility at…
  • p. 65 …His software algorithms made it possible to model lens designs and determine in advance the effects…
  • p. 76 …UNCLASSIFIED """"Igeret-ALQ Chapter 2 63 advanced gear for the U-2 pilots. David Clark expert…
  • p. 111 …of Soviet advances in long-range bombers and missiles. The initial sighting of the new Soviet…
  • p. 114 …Adenauer be informed in advance of US plans to overfly the Soviet Union from bases in…
  • p. 174 …concentrating on developing the more advanced solid-fueled missiles rather than increasing the num- ber of…
  • p. 191 …the cover story that had been prepared and distributed in advance of the mission. The first…
  • p. 250 …so urgent that the Defense Department finally re ente CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED Advanced ECM Equipment for Demand…
  • p. 265 …the U-2R needed a camera that incorporated the many im- portant advances that had occurred…
  • p. 266 …This camera was actually a very advanced version of the original B camera with a new…
  • p. 282 …aircraft from the small inventory of its most advanced bomber. Even had the B-58B program…
  • p. 295 …In fact, it was an advanced version of the highly reliable B camera developed for the…
  • p. 307 …he an- nounced the successful development of an -advanced experimental jet aircraft, the A-11. which…
  • p. 310 …It was now time to find work for the most advanced aircraft ever conceived and built…
  • p. 321 …advanced aircraft ever built was to be put out to pasture. The aban- donment of the…
  • p. 325 …when the OXCART program ended in the summer of 1968, no more advanced successor was wait…
  • p. 326 …The most advanced aircraft of the 20th century had become an anachronism before it was ever…
  • p. 333 …ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY One very important byproduct of the CIA's manned reconnaissance program was the…
  • p. 334 …the end of the usefulness of the world's most advanced aircraft; its offspring, the SR…
  • p. 335 …Thus, the CIA sponsored the development of the world's most advanced aircraft—the OXCART—and…
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FOREWORD
This History Staff Monograph offers a comprehensive and authorita-
tive history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program,
which from 1954 to 1974 developed and operated two extraordinary
aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It describes not only the
program's technological and bureaucratic aspects, but also its politi-
cal and international context. The manned reconnaissance program,
along with other overhead systems that emerged from it, changed the
CIA's work and structure in ways that were both revolutionary and
permanent. The formation of the Directorate of Science and
Technology in the 1960s, principally to develop and direct reconnais-
sance programs, is the most obvious legacy of the events recounted in
this study.
The authors tell an engrossing story. The struggle between the
CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and A-12 OXCART
projects reveals how the manned reconnaissance program confronted
problems that still beset successor programs today. The U-2 was an
enormous technological success: its first flight over the USSR in July
1956 made it immediately the most important source of intelligence
on the Soviet Union. Using it against the Soviet target it was designed
for nevertheless produced a persistent tension between its program
managers and the President. The program managers, eager for cover-
age, repeatedly urged the President to authorize frequent missions
over the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower, from the outset doubt-
ful of the prudence and propriety of invading Soviet airspace, only
reluctantly allowed any overflights at all. After the Soviets shot down
Francis Gary Powers' U-2 on I May 1960, President Eisenhower
forbade any further U-2 flights over the USSR. Since the Agency
must always assess a covert operation's potential payoff against the
diplomatic or military cost if it fails, this account of the U-2's em-
ployment over the Soviet Union offers insights that go beyond
overhead reconnaissance programs.
Indeed, this study should be useful for a variety of purposes. It is
the only history of this program based upon both full access to CIA
records and extensive classified interviews of its participants. The
authors have found records that were nearly irretrievably lost and
have interviewed participants whose personal recollections gave in-
formation available nowhere else. Although the story of the manned

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.