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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
Chapter 2
72
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005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
As the deliveries of U-2 airframes to the testing site increased, a
major logistic problem arose: how to transfer Lockheed employees
from Burbank to Iwithout arousing a great deal of curiosity.
The project staff decidu1hat the simplest approach would be to fly
the essential personnel to the site on Monday morning and return
them to Burbank on Friday evening. Frequent flights were also neces-
sary to bring in supplies and visitors from contractors and headquar-
ters. Therefore, a regularly scheduled Military Air Transport Service
(MATS) flight using a USAF C-54 aircraft began on 3 October 1955.
James Cunningham promptly dubbed this activity "Bissell's
Narrow-Gauge Airline." Less than seven weeks after it started, a
MATS aircraft bound for rashed on 17 November. killing all
14 persons aboard the p ane, including the Project Security Officer,
CIA's our members of his staff, and personnel from
Lockheed and Hycon. this crash represented the greatest single loss
of life in the entire U-2 program.""`
U-2s, UFOs, AND OPERATION BLUE BOOK
High-altitude testing of the U-2 soon led to an unexpected side
effect—a tremendous increase in reports of unidentified flyin g objects
(UFOs). In the mid-1950s, most commercial airliners flew at altitudes
between 10,000 and 20,000 feet and military aircraft like the B-47s
and B-57s operated at altitudes below 40,000 feet. Consequently,
once U-2s started flying at altitudes above 60,000 feet, air-traffic con-
trollers began receiving increasing numbers of UFO reports.
Such reports were most prevalent in the early evening hours
from pilots of airliners flying from east to west. When the sun
dropped below the horizon of an airliner flying at 20,000 feet, the
plane was in darkness. But, if a U-2 was airborne in the vicinity of the
airliner at the same time, its horizon from an altitude of 60,000 feet
was considerably more distant, and, being so high in the sky, its silver
wings would catch and reflect the rays of the sun and appear to the
airliner pilot, 40,000 feet below, to be fiery objects. Even during day-
light hours, the silver bodies of the high-flying U-2s could catch the
sun and cause reflections or glints that could be seen at lower alti-
tudes and even on the ground. At this time, no one believed manned
flight was possible above 60.000 feet, so no one expected to see an
object so high in the sky.
OSA History. chap. 7. pp. 17-19 ITS Codeword).
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.