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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
Secre FORN
Chapter 2
61
44"
AP-
Osmund J. Ritland
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
project—the construction and testing of the aircraft—remained the ex-
clusive province of Lockheed:9
As a result of this agreement, CIA remained in control of the
program, but the Air Force played a very important role as well. As
Richard Bissell later remarked about the U-2 project, "The Air Force
wasn't just in on this as a supporting element, and to a major degree it
wasn't in on it just supplying about half the government personnel;
but the Air Force held, if you want to be precise, 49 percent of the
common stock." 3°
One of the first Air Force officers assigned to Project OILSTONE
was Col. Osmund J. Ritland. He began coordinating Air Force activi-
ties in the U-2 program with Richard Bissell in December 1954. On 27
June 1955, Ritland became Bissell's deputy, although Air Force Chief
of Staff Twining did not officially approve this assignment until 4
August, the day after the signing of the CIA–Air Force agreement. In
March 1956, Colonel Ritland returned to the Air Force and was fol-
lowed as deputy project director by Col. Jack A. Gibbs.
- - Another Air Force officer, Lt. Col. Leo P. Geary, joined the pro-
gram in June 1955 and remained with it until August 1966, longer
than any of the other project managers. Using the Air Force
Inspector General's office as cover with the title of Project Officer,
AFCIG-5, Geary served as the focal point for all Defense
Department support to the U-2 and OXCART programs. His II years
with the overhead reconnaissance projects provided a high degree of
Air Force continuity!'
TECHNICAL CHALLENGES TO
HIGH-ALTITUDE FLIGHT
To get the U-2 aircraft ready to fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve
problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the
need for a fuel that would not boil off and evaporate at the very high
altitudes for which the aircraft was designed. Gen. James H. Doolittle
OSA History, chap. 3, p. 15 and annex 14 (TS Codeword).
Speech given by Richard Bissell at CIA Headquarters, 12 October 1965 (TS Codeword).
" Brig. Gen. Leo A. Geary (USAF-Ret.), interview by Donald E. Welzenbach, tape re-
cording, 3 April 1986 (S); OSA History, chap. 3, p. 3 (TS Codeword).
ret
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.