Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 4 …Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance 17 The BEACON HILL Report 17 Concern About the Danger of a…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …of this new advisory body." The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even…
  • p. 31 …Their head- quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …to implement the ideas of the BEACON HILL Report until the summer of 1953. By this…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …reconnais- sance needs expressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel, any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A. G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …6(dli1i>10<25Yrs since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. (Si James Baker…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
ielTel.411.(11\1
Chapter 2
60
devices had to be calibrated to 80,000 feet. This immediately raised
eyebrows at Kollman because its instruments only went to 45,000
feet. Agency security personnel quickly briefed several Kollman offi-
cials and produced a cover story that the altimeters were to be used on
experimental rocket planes."'
THE CIA – AIR FORCE PARTNERSHIP
At the initial interagency meetings to establish the U-2 program in
December 1954, the participants did not work out a clear delineation
of responsibilities between the CIA and the Air Force. They agreed
only that the Air Force would supply the engines and the Agency
would pay for the airframes and cameras. With a myriad of details still
unsettled, CIA and Air Force representatives began to work on an
interagency agreement that would assign specific responsibilities for
the program. These negotiations proved difficult. Discussions on this
subject between DCI Allen Dulles and Air Force Chief of Staff Nathan
Twining began in March 1955. Twining wanted SAC, headed by Gen.
Curtis E. LeMay, to run the project once the planes and pilots were
ready to fly, but Dulles opposed such an arrangement. The CIA-USAF
talks dragged on for several months, with Twining determined that
SAC should have full control once the aircraft was deployed.
Eventually President Eisenhower settled the dispute. "I want this
whole thing to be a civilian operation," the President wrote. "If uni-
formed personnel of the armed services of the United States fly over
Russia, it is an act of war—legally—and I don't want any part of it." 2$
With the issue of control over the program settled, the two agen-
cies soon worked out the remaining details. On 3 August 1955, Dulles
and Twining met at SAC headquarters in Omaha to sign the basic
agreement, titled "Organization and Delineation of Responsibilities—
Project OILSTONE" (OILSTONE was the Air Force codenarne for the
project). This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection
and training, weather information, mission plotting, and operational
support. The Agency was responsible for cameras, security, contract-
ing, film processing, and arrangements for foreign bases, and it also
had a voice in the selection of pilots. All aeronautical aspects of the
Ibid.
OSA History, chap. 3, pp. 8-15 (TS Codeword): Beschloss, Mayday, pp. 105-107.
UNCLASSIFIED

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.