Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 24 …Advanced Development Projects Division, Burbank. California. ED 129581.131011>10<25Yrs IS1 UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 58 …Pedlow, Burbank, California, 26 August 1988. Sbc.et UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 85 …how to transfer Lockheed employees from Burbank to Iwithout arousing a great deal of curiosity. The…
  • p. 273 …SP-1362, "History of the OXCART Program," Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Burbank, CA. 1 July 1968, p…
  • p. 287 …designed trailer truck that carried it from Burbank By 18 November 1959, the mockup was in…
  • p. 297 …Construction began in September 1960; a C-47 shuttle service ferried work crews from Burbank to…
  • p. 299 …The plane left Burbank on 26 February 1962 and arrived at two days later. After the…
  • p. 304 …into the engine nacelles during assembly at Burbank were sucked into the power plant during initial…
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Chapter 1
32
camera with tremendously improved resolution and film capacity, and
the Eastman Kodak company was working on new thin, lightweight
film."
By October 1954, the Project Three study group had drafted a
complete program for an overhead reconnaissance effort based on the
CL-282 aircraft. The one remaining question was who would conduct
the overflights. The committee's members, particularly Land, were
not in favor of the Air Force conducting such missions in peacetime.
Firmly believing that military overflights in armed aircraft could pro-
voke a war, they argued for civilian overflights in unarmed, unmarked
aircraft. In their view, the organization most suited for this mission
was the Central Intelligence Agency.6
In late October 1954, the Project Three panel discussed the
CL-282 system concept with DCI Allen Dulles and the Secretary of
the Air Force's Special Assistant for Research and Development,
Trevor Gardner. Dulles was reluctant to have the CIA undertake the
project. He did not like to involve the CIA with military projects, even
ones that the military had rejected, like the CL-282. Furthermore. the
DCI strongly believed that the Agency's mission lay in the use of hu-
man operatives and secret communications, the classic forms of intel-
ligence gathering. Land came away from this meeting with the
impression that Dulles somehow thought overflights were not fair
play. Project Three committee members were nevertheless convinced
that technology, particularly in the form of the CL-282 and the new
camera designs, would solve the nation's intelligence problems."
A Meeting With the President
Allen Dulles's reluctance to involve the CIA in the CL-282 project did
not stop the Project Three committee from pursuing its aims because it
was able to go over Dulles's head and appeal directly to the President.
Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence
Systems Panel, several Project Three members had definite ideas on
how to improve intelligence collection, ideas that they were deter-
mined to present to the highest levels of government. They were able
" Land interview (TS Codeword).
Land interview (TS Codeword): Baker interview (S).
" Land interview (TS Cotieword).
SJiret
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.