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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
Chapter 1
27
James R. Killian, Jr.
et
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Gardner, the committee members decided to approach President
Eisenhower on the matter. On 27 March 1954, the President told them
about the discovery of the Soviet Bison bombers and his concern that
these new aircraft might be used in a surprise attack on the United
States. Stressing the high priority he gave to reducing the risk of mili-
tary surprise, the President asked the committee to advise him on this
problem."
The President's request led Chairman DuBridge to ask one of the
most prominent members, MIT President James R. Killian, Jr., to
meet with other Science Advisory Committee members in the Boston
area to discuss the feasibility of a comprehensive scientific assess-
ment of the nation's defenses. At their meeting at MIT on 15 April
1954, the g roup called for the recruitment of such a task force if the
President endorsed the concept.
On 26 July 1954, President Eisenhower authorized Killian to re-
cruit and lead a panel of experts to study "the country's technologi-
cal capabilities to meet some of its current problems." Killian
quickly set up shop in offices located in the Old Executive Office
Buildin g and organized 42 of the nation's leading scientists into
three special project groups investigating US offensive, defensive,
and intelligence capabilites, with an additional communications
working g roup (see chart, page 28). The Technological Capabilities
Panel (TCP) groups began meeting on 13 September 1954. For the
next 20 weeks, the members of the various panels met on 307 sepa-
rate occasions for briefings, field trips, conferences, and meetings
with every major unit of the US defense and intelligence establish-
ments. After receiving the most up-to-date information available on
the nation's defense and intelligence programs, the panel members
began drafting their report to the National Security Council.46
Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282
Even before the final Technological Capabilities Panel report was
ready, one of the three workin g groups took actions that would have a
major impact on the US reconnaissance program. Project Three had
" Beschloss, Mayday, pp. 73-74: Technolouical Capabilities Panel of the Science
Advisory Committee. Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack. 14 February 1955, p. 185
(hereafter cited as TCP Report) (TS/Restricted Data. downgraded to Sy
James R. Killian, Jr., Sputnik, Scientists. and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First
Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Cambridge: MIT Press.
1977), p. 68: Beschloss, Maplay, p. 74: TCP Report. pp. 185-186 (S).
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.